The effects of 1985 defense policy on the defense infrastructure of Turkey by Aksoy, Murat
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1995-12
The effects of 1985 defense policy on the defense
infrastructure of Turkey
Aksoy, Murat
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/31267
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 
THESIS 
THE EFFECTS OF 1985 DEFENSE POLICY 





Thesis Advisor: Peter R. Lavoy 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
19960415 070 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching easting data 
sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.  
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2.      REPORT DATE 
December, 1995 
3.     REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master's Thesis 
TITLE AND SUBTITLE THE EFFECTS OF 1985 DEFENSE POLICY ON THE 
DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE OF TURKEY 
6.     AUTHOR(S) Murat Aksoy 
FUNDING NUMBERS 
7.     PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 




9.     SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10.   SPONSORING/MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
ll.   SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13.   ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
Turkey established a new defense policy in 1985 designed to build an indigenous defense 
industrial infrastructure. The policy has been in effect for nearly ten years. This study 
examines the new defense policy to determine whether it has been effective in its stated 
purposes of modernizing the Turkish Armed Forces and developing of a civilian infrastructure 
to support the armed forces. The method used is a detailed survey of the armored combat 
vehicle project, the largest project currently managed by the government organization put in 
place with the policy. The study shows that the policy creates the desired infrastructure, but 
that the current economic conditions inside Turkey make it difficult for Turkey to remain with 
the policy due to the high initial investment cost. 
14.   SUBJECT TERMS Turkey, Defense Infrastructure, SSM, Joint Ventures, 
Technological Transfer. 
15.   NUMBER OF 
PAGES '90 
16.   PRICE CODE 
17.   SECURITY CLASSIFI- 
CATION OF REPORT 
Unclassified 
18.   SECURITY CLASSIFI- 
CATION OF THIS PAGE 
Unclassified 
19.   SECURITY CLASSIFICA- 
TION OF ABSTRACT 
Unclassified 
20. LIMITATION OF 
ABSTRACT 
UL 
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 {Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 298-102 
11 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
THE EFFECTS OF 1985 DEFENSE POLICY ON THE DEFENSE 
INFRASTRUCTURE OF TURKEY 
Murat Aksoy 
B.S., Middle East Technical University, 1990 
Submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT 
from the 





Peter R. Lavoy, Thesis Advisor 
erry Johnson, Second Reader 
Rueben T. Harris, Chairman 




Turkey established a new defense policy in 1985 designed to build an 
indigenous defense industrial infrastructure. The policy has been in effect for nearly 
ten years. This study examines the new defense policy to determine whether it has 
been effective in its stated purposes of modernizing the Turkish Armed Forces and 
developing of a civilian infrastructure to support the armed forces. The method used 
is a detailed survey of the armored combat vehicle project, the largest project 
currently managed by the government organization put in place with the policy. The 
study shows that the policy creates the desired infrastructure, but that the current 
economic conditions inside Turkey make it difficult for Turkey to remain with the 
policy due to the high initial investment cost. 
VI 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
A. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 1 
1. New Defense Policy 2 
2. Turkey's Defense Industrial Strategy  2 
3. Technological Transfer  3 
B. METHODOLOGY   3 
1. Turkish Armed Forces Requirements  4 
2. Criteria for Measuring the Success of Turkey's New Policy 4 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 5 
II. FACTORS AFFECTING TURKEY'S DEFENSE POLICY 7 
A. INTRODUCTION 7 
B. GEO-STRATEGIC POSITION 8 
1. Regional Military Forces 8 
2. NATO   9 
3. Regional Instabilities 11 
4. Disputes With Neighboring Countries 14 
C. ECONOMIC 19 
1. Government Budgeting 19 
2. Acquiring Technology 20 
3. Economic Benefits from the New Defense Policy 21 
D. SUMMARY 23 
III. TURKISH DEFENSE ACQUISITION STRATEGY 25 
A. INTRODUCTION 25 
B. UNDERSECRETARIAT FOR DEFENSE INDUSTRIES (SSM) 25 
Vll 
1. Decisionmaking Organization 26 
2. Financing 28 
3. Acquisition Process for Defense Projects  28 
C. CHANNELS FOR TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFER 29 
1. Offsets 31 
2. Research and Development 33 
3. Summary 34 
D. ECONOMIC FACTORS 34 
1. Switching to Liberal Economy  35 
2. Inflation  35 
3. International Arms Trade 37 
E. TECHNICAL FACTORS  37 
1. Quality Control  3g 
2. Technical Infrastructure 39 
3. Scale of Manufacture and Amortizing Costs 39 
F. JOINT VENTURES 40 
1. Armored Combat Vehicle (ACV) 40 
2. F-16 Electronic Warfare Systems Project 40 
3. HF/SSB Radios Project 40 
4. Basic Training Aircraft  41 
5. Mobile Radar Complex Project 41 
6. Light Transport Aircraft Project   41 
G. SUMMARY 42 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW POLICY 43 
A. INTRODUCTION 43 
B. ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLE PROJECT 44 
C. LOCAL CONTENT 44 
1.        Acquired Technology and Management Capabilities 45 
viii 
2. Local Content Targets 45 
3. Current Local Content 46 
4. Sources of Material  48 
D. NEWMARKETS 49 
1. Defense Market 50 
2. Civilian Market 51 
E. COST 54 
1. Offsets 54 
2. Life Cycle Cost  55 
F. TECHNOLOGY  56 
G. SUMMARY 57 
V. CONCLUSION: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 59 
A. FINDINGS 59 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 59 
APPENDIX 61 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 73 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 75 
IX 

LIST OF FIGURES 
1. Turkey and Regional Instabilities 9 
2. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 12 
3. Aegean Sea with Six Mile Territorial Waters 15 
4. Aegean Sea with Twelve Mile Territorial Waters 16 
5. Employment in the Aircraft Industry of Turkey 22 
6. Organization of Committees and SSM 27 
7. Acquisition Process 30 
8. Exchange Rate Turkish Lira to U.S. Dollar 36 
9. Technological Expertise of Support Companies 46 
10. Components Used in Meeting the 73% Requirement 47 
11. Locally Produced Components 48 
12. Imported Material/Local Material 49 
13. M-l 13 Upgrade Market 52 
14. Maintenance and Labor Cost of the Major Components (20 Years) 56 
xi 
xn 
LIST OF TABLES 
1. Defense Expenditures   10 
2. Direct and Indirect Offset Commitments 31 
3. Targeted Local Content 33 
4. Research and Development Funding 34 
5. Important NATO and MIL Specifications 38 




A.       BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
Events in recent history demonstrate that modern wars are based on advanced 
technology. Countries that lack a modern defense industry and advanced military 
technologies are not able to deter or effectively fight modern wars. 
Turkey is in a politically volatile region of the world, thus it is important for Turkey 
to develop the industrial infrastructure to provide for its defense. Although Turkey has been 
at peace for more than seventy years, it is surrounded by armed conflicts and ethnic strife. 
The end of the Cold War has reduced the importance of NATO to the United States; 
Western Europe no longer faces a Soviet threat. Consequently, the incentives for support 
from the United States and Western Europe for the Turkish Armed Forces are also reduced. 
A robust, self-reliant defense industry is even more important because the U.S. and Western 
Europe's defense budgets are declining and their transfer of military aid to Turkey is also 
declining. 
Turkey has faced difficulties with embargos imposed due to foreign policy decisions 
made by Turkey in its own defense. The United States embargo after the Turkish Peace 
Operation in Cyprus in 1974 and the recent German embargo that froze military grants to 
Turkey in March of this year because of the Turkish operations in Northern Iraq against the 
Marxist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorists are examples of the international 
pressures as a result of Turkey's security behavior. 
The effects of these embargos on Turkey's defense highlight the inadequacy of 
Turkey's current defense infrastructure. This factor, the lack of natural resources, and the 
needs of the Turkish Armed Forces that have accumulated over the last several decades have 
led Turkey to establish a new defense policy.1 
i Vahit Erdem, "Constituting a Defence Industry Infrastructure.", NATO'S Sixteen Nations, No. 4 (1993), 90-95. 
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The purpose of this study is to determine how successful the new government policy 
for the development of a domestic defense infrastructure has been in regard to transfers of 
technology to the civilian industrial sector in Turkey. 
1. New Defense Policy 
In 1985, Turkey established a new policy designed to increase its domestic defense 
industry infrastructure. Up until that time, Turkey's domestic production of defense material 
was performed only by publicly owned manufacturers. 
The new policy was designed to liberalize the manufacture of defense material by 
allowing civilian concerns inside Turkey and foreign manufacturers to provide defense 
material for the Turkish Armed Forces. The Turkish government has established this policy 
so that the modernization of the armed forces will produce a transfer of technology to 
domestic manufacturers and provide a less expensive means in terms of foreign currency 
reserves to modernize the Turkish Armed Forces. 
To implement this policy, in 1985 Turkey established The Undersecretariat for 
Defence Industry (SSM)2 and dedicated special taxes to pay for the modernization of the 
Turkish Armed Forces. 
2. Turkey's Defense Industrial Strategy 
The Undersecretariat for Defence Industry was established to implement the new 
policy and perform the following functions:3 
• To develop modern defense industries capable of catering to the modernization 
needs of Turkish Armed Forces. 
• Acquire and disseminate maximum amount of technology to Turkish industrial 
infrastructure. 
• Identify and make optimum use of existing capabilities and capacities. 
• Promote innovative and export oriented joint ventures and national consortiums. 
• Patronize defense oriented Research and Development (R&D) programs to 
accelerate technological and scientific advancement. 
Savunma Sanayii Müste§arhgi - Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) 
Undersecretariat For Defence Industries, Savunma Sanayii Muste§arhgi (Ankara: SSM, 1991). 
• Coordinate export and off-set matters related to defense industries. 
This thesis primarily addresses the first two functions of the SSM: developing a 
modern defense capability focussing on the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces and 
transferring the maximum amount of technology to the Turkish industrial infrastructure. 
3. Technological Transfer 
Foreign companies are reluctant to transfer their latest military technologies because 
of the shrinking market for weapons technology and a fear of creating their own competition 
for that market. In order to cope with the reluctance to transfer technology and encourage 
foreign investment, Turkey prefers to use the joint venture approach to gain technological 
expertise. An additional advantage of this arrangement is that the foreign companies risk 
capital in Turkey and the cost to the Turkish economy is lower. 
Beginning in 1986, contracts have been awarded and joint ventures established with 
foreign companies to produce advanced weapon systems that are urgently needed by the 
Turkish Armed Forces. 
Recently, Turkey has produced several advanced weapon systems as joint projects 
with local companies and foreign arms manufacturers. To accomplish this, it was necessary 
for Turkey to overcome many challenges. Some of these challenges are, local financing, the 
absence of the required technological base, implementation of quality control and NATO 
standards, and arms embargoes related to technological transfer and political action by other 
countries. While carrying out this new defense policy, Turkey has strived to utilize its limited 
resources in the most efficient manner and maximize the return on those resources, with a 
further goal of acquiring the technological base for both its defense industries and its 
domestic economy. 
B.   METHODOLOGY 
The method of this thesis is to survey Turkey's current defense industries to 
determine if the change in policy has been effective in creating the infrastructure necessary 
to support the armed forces. The second question is to determine if this infrastructure has 
resulted in transfers of the technological base to the civilian sector of Turkey's economy. 
1. Turkish Armed Forces Requirements 
The Turkish Armed Forces determine their requirements based on Turkey's 
geopolitical position in the world. To outline the needs driving the modernization effort for 
Turkish Armed Forces, it is necessary to survey the unrest in Turkey's region and its 
geopolitical position. Turkey lies in a region of the world which lately has become the focus 
of world attention. Bosnia is at the top of the agenda for the United States and NATO, 
Azerbaijan has faded from the news but there still is ethnic unrest in both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan.. After the Gulf War, Northern Iraq has been virtually without any government 
and the two groups of Kurds that control the region are at war with each other. The 
Commonwealth of Independent States are individually still trying to establish stable 
governments. Turkey has a long running disagreement with the world community over the 
issue of the Turkish Cypriots. Recently, Turkey has come in conflict with Greece over 
Greece's international territorial water claims. 
Requests for defense equipment are made through the Under Secretary of Defence 
Industries by the armed forces. Because the requests are received from the armed forces, it 
is unnecessary to consider whether a particular project meets the needs of the Turkish Aimed 
Forces. However, other criteria for a successful project must be examined to determine 
whether Turkey's new policy is successful. 
2. Criteria for Measuring the Success of Turkey's New Policy 
To answer the research question in this thesis, the author examines in detail the 
armored combat vehicle, a one and a half billion dollar project currently managed by the 
Undersecretariat for Defense Industry. This project was chosen as an example of the type 
of project Turkey wishes to pursue to improve the domestic defense infrastructure. For this 
project the following questions will be answered. Whether the Turkish manufacturer or a 
supporting manufacturer: 
• has acquired technology and management capabilities? 
• has acquired new markets? 
• has acquired a permanent industrial base? 
• has reduced the cost of equipping and maintaining Turkey's Armed Forces? 
• has maximized the use of existing capabilities?4 
To answers these questions for the armored combat vehicle project, an analysis of the 
project and the technologies acquired through the project will be made in Chapter IV. 
C.        ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This chapter has given an introduction and the methodology to be used to answer how 
successful the new defense policy of Turkey in the transfer of management techniques and 
technical expertise to the Turkish industrial infrastructure. Chapter II outlines the reasons 
that Turkey needs to develop a domestic defense industry infrastructure. Chapter III surveys 
the current strategies for the development of the Turkish defense industry and some of the 
current joint ventures undertaken by Turkey to modernize its armed forces. Chapter IV is a 
detailed analysis of the armored fighting vehicle project and its contribution to the defense 
and civilian industries infrastructure. Chapter V is a summary of the results of the thesis and 
a brief conclusion about the effectiveness of the policy. 
4
    Undersecretaries For Defence Industries, Savunma Sanayii Müste§arhgi (Ankara: SSM, 1991). 
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II. FACTORS AFFECTING TURKEY'S DEFENSE POLICY 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
In order to answer the research questions presented in this thesis, whether Turkey's 
new defense infrastructure policy is effective, it is necessary to know what factors drive 
Turkish foreign policy and defense policies. 
The guiding principle of Turkish foreign policy is embodied in Atatiirk's motto of 
"Peace at Home, Peace in the World."5 The basic tenets of Turkish defense policy as 
outlined by Nevzat Ayaz (former minister of National Defense): 
• To take the necessary steps to maintain peace in Turkey and the world. 
• To make all national means available to diffuse international tension and establish 
a legitimate and lasting peace. 
• To preserve the independence and integrity of the nation and maintain the 
indivisibility of the country. 
• To take all preventative measures to avoid war. 
• To take part in the collective defense systems and carry out the responsibilities 
entrusted to it in this context.6 
Within these principles, Turkey's foreign policy and relations are conducted based on mutual 
friendship, respect for territorial integrity, non-interference in the domestic affairs of other 
nations, and the balancing of mutual interests between itself and others. Turkey maintains 
that arguments and disagreements between nations should be resolved by means of 
negotiation.7 But Turkey exists in a less than ideal world and although Turkey has peaceful 
aspirations, it cannot remain indifferent to external events. 
Turkey's decision to modernize the armed forces and develop its defense industry 
infrastructure are based on obligations resulting from Turkey's geographical position and a 
5
 Nevzat Ayaz, "Deterrent Shield - Turkish Security and Defence Policy and Its Defence Industry," NATO'S 
Sixteen Nations, No4(1993):19. 
6
 Ibid. 19. 
7
 "International Relations" (Internet http://home.imc.net/turkey/politics.htm), Foundation for Middle East and 
Balkan Studies (OBIV), (Istanbul: June 1994). 
need to improve its domestic economy. Resources are limited and must be used in the most 
efficient way. Turkey believes that by producing more defense material domestically or 
through joint ventures, the effects of the demands imposed by modernization on the domestic 
economy can be reduced. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part is an introduction, the second 
part covers the unrest in the area surrounding Turkey and the disputes that Turkey has with 
its neighbors. The final section addresses the economic issues associated with the new 
defense policy. 
B.        GEO-STRATEGIC POSITION 
Turkey is located between the continents of Asia and Europe and borders the Arab 
states of the Middle East. Turkey's position led directly to its membership in NATO in 1952. 
Up until the end of the Cold War, Turkey was considered a major land barrier to the Soviet 
ambitions in the Persian Gulf. Now, Turkey is even more important to NATO because it is 
located between areas of unrest in both Europe and the Middle East.8 Turkey is surrounded 
by a great deal of instability and faced with security challenges of great complexity from 
diverse sources. Turkey must maintain credible armed forces able to meet its security needs.9 
1. Regional Military Forces 
Table 1 shows the defense expenditures for the nations in the region of Turkey. It can 
be seen that Turkey's defense expenditures as both a function of its population (Armed 
Forces personnel/1,000 citizens) and in terms of its gross national product (defense 
expenditures/GNP) is modest for the region. Turkey's intent with the increase of its defense 
expenditures is not to enlarge its military but to restructure and modernize the Armed Forces 
of Turkey. The Army of Turkey intends to decrease its size and produce a smaller more 
capable and more mobile force better fitted to the needs of Turkey in the post-Cold War 
Mark Stenhous, "Turkey" in Jane's NATO Handbook, 4th Edition, ed. Bruce George (Coulsdon, Surrey: 1991), 
316. 
Dogan Güres, "For Justice and Civilization - The Strategic Involvement of Turkey and Restructuring of the 
Turkish Axmed.'FoTcts," NATO'S Sixteen Nations, No. 4(1993): 16. 
8 
period. The Turkish Air Force is following a program of replacing its older generation 
aircraft with F-16's by the year 2000. The Navy's plans are to retire old destroyers and 
submarines. In their place, the Navy plans to construct guided missile frigates, fast patrol 
boats, and newer designed submarines.10 
Figure 1. Turkey and Regional Instabilities. 
2. NATO 
Turkey has been a full member of NATO since 1952. With the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the Warsaw Pact and the unification of Germany, the center of NATO's concerns 
have moved south to the Balkans. The collapse of the Soviet Union has also allowed long 
suppressed conflicts and ethnic divisions to arise in the new states that were formed. 
Surrounded by this unrest, Turkey, a democratic secular state which has common ideals 
10
   Ibid. 16. 
shared with both the NATO alliance and with the new countries that have been formed in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus. Turkey is a stabilizing influence in a region of unrest. Turkey 
has common historical and linguistic ties to the countries in the Caucasus region and Central 
Asia. As a consequence of these events, Turkey is even more important to NATO now than 
it was in the East-West conflict of the Cold War. This can be seen in Turkey's central role 











Turkey 60.9 11.3 5.8 
Iran 62.0 8.5 3.5 
Iraq 19.2* 21.2 20" 
Greece 10.5 20.3 5.5 
Russia 149.0 15.1 14.6 
Syria 14.3 28.5 14.6+ 
Ukraine 51.8 9.8 NA 
1993 Data'2 
+1990 Data was the la st year reported. 
Table 1. Defense Expenditures 
Even though the Soviet Union has collapsed, Russia remains a very powerful country 
with overwhelming military capabilities in the southern region of NATO. Unlike some of 
the other NATO allies in the southern region of the Mediterranean, Turkey has always seen 
1
'   Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1992, World Armaments and Disarmament 
(Oxford University Press 1992), 265. 
12
   U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1992-1993 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993). 
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the Russian threat as real and for Turkey a historical reality. Turkey's Armed Forces are the 
second largest armed forces in the NATO alliance.13 
3. Regional Instabilities 
a.        Armenia and Azerbaijan 
On the eastern border of Turkey, before the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan were in conflict. Armenia has a majority Christian population and 
lays claim to an area of Azerbaijan. In 1988 Soviet Government troops imposed order 
between the two republics, but after the breakup of the Soviet Union both republics were 
again at war with each other. Additionally, Turkey views Armenia's claims on so-called 
Turkish Armenia with some alarm. This war between Azerbaijan and Armenia is also a cause 
of tension with Iran. The Iranian Government fears that Turkish influence in the region 
(Iranian Azeris who make up twenty-five percent of Iran's population) could encourage a 
succession from Iran. This area is very volatile and Russian assistance to the Armenians is 
clearly helping the Armenians win the war. In September 1993, Turkey threatened direct 
military intervention if any new Armenian offenses were launched against Nakhichevan 
enclave in Armenia.'4 
This region, after the collapse of the Soviet Empire, has emerging long 
suppressed nationalist movements which are still very much in flux. Turkey finds itself in 
the position of attempting to remain neutral in past grievances for which the parties for 
historical reasons believe Turkey has some responsibility. For example, Turkey should have 
the same economic relationship with Armenia that it has with Georgia, but because there 
exists a minority in Armenia that links Turkey to a time when it was the Ottoman Empire, 
Turkey finds itself in the position of protecting a minority in Armenia at the great strategic 
risk of antagonizing the Russians who are the supporters of the Armenians. In fact, Russian 
Army Chief of Staff, General Shaposhnikov has warned that if Turkey enters the region 
13
 Graham E. Fuller, Ian O. Lesser, Paul B. Henze, and J. F. Brown, Turkey's New Geopolitics from the Balkans to 
Western China. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 112-113. 
14
 James Wyllie, "Country Briefing Turkey," Jane's Defence Weekly (September 16, 1995): 26. 
11 
militarily, the conflict could turn into a Third World War.15 This scenario has similarities to 
the 1914 incidents in the Balkans leading to the First World War. 
Caspian Sea 
Figure 2. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. 
b. Balkans 
A lack of a firm western response in the Bosnia and Herzegovina situation in 
what use to be Yugoslavia and the Serbs and Croats ethnic cleansing has led the Muslim 
world to believe that Europe and the West are passively permitting the liquidation of the last 
Muslim outpost in Europe. The inaction by the European Community seems to shift 
responsibility for the Bosnian Muslim toward Turkey. Turkey is supplied 1,500 troops for 
the protection forces in Bosnia. Turkey is also a member of NATO and a participant in any 
1S
   Fuller, et. al., Turkey's New Geopolitics, 78. 
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questions of NATO's reaction in the Balkans. The Turkish and Iranian diplomatic rivalry is 
very much affected by the actions of NATO and the UN in Bosnia. The Turkey's diplomatic 
overtures in Central Asia and competition with Iran for influence in that region, could lead 
Turkey to take strong actions to protect the Bosnian Muslims.16 
c.        Kurds 
The Gulf War has amplified the Kurdish problem in the region of Eastern 
Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. These groups are not the PKK. These groups are a result of Saddam 
Hussein's brutal actions against the Kurd people in northern Iraq. With Iraq's loss of control 
in the region, and some autonomy for these groups in northern Iraq, there could be a political 
movement to establish independent Kurdish state. This is viewed by Turkey with a great deal 
of alarm. Turkey before the Gulf War, had been in the process of liberalizing its laws and 
recognizing the Kurdish culture. Turkey is also embarked on a program to improve the 
economic level for its very poor populace in southeastern Turkey. The PKK is taking 
advantage of the general unrest and the natural human sympathy for the plights of the Kurds 
in northern Iraq with typical terrorist tactics that communist insurgencies have practiced 
throughout the world in the last fifty years. These tactics have one thing in common they are 
always used when the insurgency cannot muster the local support for their cause, and instead 
seek publicity and compel support from simple people who have to be more worried about 
their survival than either their ethnic background or political condition.17 
Turkey intends to improve the standard of living in southeastern Turkey and 
has invested over 32 billion dollars in water projects to improve farming and agriculture. 
Although Turkey is one of the seven agriculturally self-sufficient nations in the world, this 
project's main thrust is to improve the division of resources between western and eastern 
Turkey. These projects have strained relations with Syria and Iraq.18 
16
 Ibid. 76; 153. 
17
 Fuller, et al., Turkey's New Geopolitics, 46. 
18
 "Separatis Terror: Menace of the Post Cold-War Period, A Case Study of the PKK in Turkey," (Internet 
http://home.imc.net/turkey/politics.htm), Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBIV), (Istanbul: 
June 1994). 
13 
Although Turkey has offered to negotiate with Syria over issues involving the 
diversion of water from the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, media reports suggest that instead 
Syria has opted to support the PKK. Recent activity by the PKK coinciding with the 
completion of the Birecik Dam on the Euphrates River, lends credence to the media reports.19 
d. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
To the north of Turkey, what use to be the Soviet Union is now the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. The CIS members currently suffer significant 
economic and political disadvantages as compared to Western Europe. The Russian 
federation, the largest member of the CIS consists of twenty-one autonomous republics with 
a common military force. All of these nations and the Russian federation have common 
problems. From the viewpoint of destabilizing factors the two most important problems are 
first, conservative forces that wish to return to the glory days of the Soviet Union and second, 
these states are still involved in a struggle for supremacy of the parliamentary body versus 
the executive body of the government. Additionally, the form that Russian nationalism will 
take has yet made itself known. Russia is the largest military power in the region and still 
possesses a very effective military force. The direction that Russian nationalism takes is very 
important to Turkey and has been so historically.20 
4. Disputes With Neighboring Countries 
a.        Rivalry Between Turkey and Greece 
Despite a common membership in NATO, Turkey and Greece have been 
rivals in the Aegean Sea for many years. In June 1995, Greece announced its intention to 
extend its territorial waters to twelve miles in accordance with the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Treaty. Turkey is not a party to the treaty and believes that if the Greek Government enforces 
the twelve mile limit, it would be a violation of international law and be an intrusion into 
areas considered by Turkey to be high seas and international air space. This action would 
severely limit Turkish access to the Aegean Sea and obstruct the sea lanes leading to the 
Ibid. 
Dogan Giires, "Turkey's Defence Policy: The Role of the Armed Forces and Strategy, Concepts and 
Capabilities," RUSI Journal, 138, no. 3 (June 1993): 1-7. 
14 
Black Sea. Turkey does not question the Greek sovereignty of the Aegean Islands near the 
coast of Turkey.21 Access to the Black Sea and Greek boundaries were established by the 
Treaty of Lausanne 1923.22 Figure 3 and 4 illustrate the disagreement.23 Figure 3 depicts a 
six mile territorial limit and Figure 4 depicts a twelve-mile territorial limit which would 
remove all international sea routes through the Aegean Sea. 
TURKEY 
MEDITERRANEAN 
Figure 3. Aegean Sea with Six Mile Territorial Waters.24 
21
 Dogan Güres, "For Justice and Civilization - The Strategic Involvement of Turkey and Restructuring of the 
Turkish Armed Forces," NATO'S Sixteen Nations, No. 4 (1993): 10-16. 
22
 Paul M. Pitman III, ed., Turkey, A Country Study, 4th edition (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1988), 48. 
23
 Ibid. 161 
24




Figure 4. Aegean Sea with Twelve Mile Territorial Waters. 
There is also friction between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. Cyprus has 
been divided since 1974 as a result of a Turkish Peace Operation to prevent a military coup 
from realizing its aim to annex Cyprus for another country. Turkey was a guarantor of the 
London Treaties of 1959 and 1960 and because of inaction of the international community 
to protect the Turkish Cypriot community, Turkey felt obligated to act unilaterally to prevent 
the probable extermination of the Turkish Cypriots. Since 1974, the Turkish and Greek 
16 
Communities of Cyprus have been living peacefully in their respective territories.25 The 
Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus both enjoy a higher 
standard of living than mainland Greece or Turkey. In fact, if the problems in Cyprus were 
settled, Cyprus would be a prime candidate for European Community (EC) membership.26 
Turkish and Greek interests are in conflict in the Balkans. Turkey has 1,500 
troops serving with United Nations protection forces in Bosnia. Greek sympathies are with 
the Orthodox Serbs and the Greek Government has not been diligent in maintaining the UN 
economic embargo on Serbia.27 
Turkey also feels some responsibility for the Muslim population of Albania. 
Relations between Greece and Albania have taken a down turn since the end of the Cold War 
with the Greek expulsion of Albanian workers.28 
b.        Iran 
Turkey's relations with Iran have been complicated by the situation in 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkey and Iran are engaged in a rivalry for influence in Central 
Asia. With the independence of Azerbaijan, the Iranian Azeris, who speak a Turkic dialect 
which is virtually identical to the language spoken in Azerbaijan and nearly identical to the 
Turkish of modern Turkey, have long been an integral part of Iranian society. Now, with the 
independence of Azerbaijan, the Iranians fear that the Azeris will wish to form a union with 
Azerbaijan. This Iranian fear that twenty-five percent of their population will wish to join 
in a union with Azerbaijan has created a competition between Turkey and Iran for influence 
in the region. Turkey was the first state to recognize Azerbaijan's independence in 1991. The 
current government of Azerbaijan and Turkey are on close terms diplomatically. The Iranian 
Government would like to have more influence in the region both culturally and 
25
 Güres, "For Justice and Civilization," 14. 
26
 Fuller, Turkey's New Geopolitics, 113. 
27
 Wyllie, "Country Briefing Turkey," 25. 
28
 Ibid. 25. 
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diplomatically because of its fears that there will be internal unrest inside Iran if Azerbaijan 
successfully adopts its pan-Turkish policies.29 
c. Georgia 
In Georgia, a Civil War with the Muslim province of Abkhazia has been 
brought to an end with the support of Russian troops. This again brings Russian forces in 
contact with the borders of Turkey.30 Georgia's land links to Turkey have become a route for 
private enterprise. Georgia purchases of Turkish goods have reached 15 million dollars per 
year and Turkey is increasing the electricity that it exports to Georgia. However, ethnic strife 
within Georgia, which is a majority Christian country, has negative effects within Turkey 
and threatens one of the most potentially important economic partnerships in the Black Sea.31 
d. Iraq 
In March of 1995, the Turkish Army launched an operation into northern Iraq 
against the Marxist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). This group has been responsible for 
terrorist attacks in southeastern Turkey. The operation lasted approximately six weeks and 
destroyed the PKK's infrastructure and supply chain in northern Iraq. At the end of the Gulf 
War, Turkey as other members of the coalition, participated in "Operation Provide Comfort" 
which was intended to shield Iraqi Kurds from the retaliation of Saddam Hussein. Turkey 
fully supports Iraq's territorial integrity, but because the two groups of Iraqi Kurds are in a 
power struggle with each other, there is no restraint on PKK activities in northern Iraq.32 
Turkey has withdrawn its troops and reinforced its border areas in an attempt to prevent the 
PKK terrorism on Turkish territory. This is considered by Turkey no more than a defense of 
its own borders and no different an action than many countries have been forced to take in 
their own defense. 
29
 Fuller, Turkey's New Geopolitics, 82-85. 
30
 Wyllie, "Country Briefing Turkey," 26. 
3
' Fuller, Turkey 's New Geopolitics, 80-81. 
32
 Wyllie, "Country Briefing Turkey," 29. 
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Turkey does not wish to see an independent Kurdish state formed in northern 
Iraq because it believes it would destabilize the region.33 
e. Syria 
Turkey has three issues with Syria. The first is that Syria provides asylum for 
the PKK. Up until 1993, the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, actually had his headquarters in 
Damascus. Although Syria expelled him, in actual practice, the PKK still enjoys Syrian 
asylum. Syria allows this in order to pressure Turkey on the second issue which is the 
Turkish control of the water flow of the Euphrates River. The completion of the Ataturk dam 
which controls the water flow of the Euphrates is part of a project to irrigate 1.7 million 
hectares of land in southeast Turkey. This dam is expected to provide economic 
improvement in one of the poorest regions of Turkey. It is related to the PKK problem 
because this region is inhabited by fifty percent of the Turkish Kurdish population. The third 
difference with Damascus is over the decision of the French mandate in 1939 to cede the 
Province of Hatay to Turkey long before Syrian independence in 1946.34 
C.        ECONOMIC 
1. Government Budgeting 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the incentive to provide military aid to Turkey 
has decreased. The governments of the United States and Western Europe have decreased 
their direct military aid. In fiscal year of 1994, the aid to Turkey from the United States was 
$405 million dollars and it decreased to $364 million dollars in 1995. In 1995, the Congress 
of the United States withheld ten percent of the military aid because of concerns over human 
rights in Turkey. The reality of the $405 million dollars in aid is that $325 million of it was 
dedicated to one program, the F-16. In 1995 that left only $3 million dollars in direct aid for 
Turkey to purchase military systems. The United States has also changed its aid from the 
direct supply of equipment to aid which is purchased inside the United States. Although this 
33
 "Separatis Terror" 
34
 Wyllie, "Country Briefing Turkey," 29 
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appears to be in the United States budget as foreign aid, in fact, it is money that is spent in 
the United States and does not assist Turkey in its purchases of defense equipment. Another 
method the United States has used to save money is to guarantee loans for the purchase of 
equipment in the United States. Turkey must of course acquire the loan and pay interest as 
any individual or country would. Although this is counted as foreign aid, it's identical to any 
individual borrowing money against future income. Turkey's economy at the current time, 
is experiencing more than a seventy percent inflation rate. It is very risky for Turkey to 
borrow money with the current economic conditions of the domestic economy. 
2.        Acquiring Technology 
The modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces through joint projects with 
technologically capable foreign companies, will result in the transfer of leading edge 
technologies to the private Turkish companies involved in the production of military 
equipment. Of course, most leading edge military technologies have difficulty finding a place 
in the civilian market. However, the base technologies and manufacturing methods for this 
equipment will find its way into civilian markets and will enable Turkish companies to 
compete better both domestically and in world trade.35 
An infrastructure which can support and manufacture high level technologies will 
allow Turkey to provide for more independent decisions both in domestic matters and in 
international relations. For example, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, many liberal 
Western European nations no longer feel the pressure of a threat from the Soviet Empire or 
will be threatened by the unrest in the area of the world that surrounds Turkey. Sources of 
supply in those countries could be interrupted because domestic politics have become more 
important to the countries leadership than the countries international alliances. Because the 
source of supply is from that Western European nation, Turkey's policies would be driven 
by the domestic politics ofthat country instead of the needs of Turkey. For example, the 
recent decision by the German Government to stop arms flow to Turkey because domestic 
Ayaz, "Deterrent Shield," 23. 
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elements in Germany accused the Turkish Government of using German manufactured 
weapons in its operation in Iraqi territory to defend itself against the PKK. 
3. Economic Benefits from the New Defense Policy 
Turkey intends, by the turn of the century, to be a fully industrialized country at a 
level similar to the Western European nations. To accomplish this, the defense sector of 
Turkey's economy must contribute technology and manufacturing capabilities to the civilian 
economy. 
a. Providing Employment 
Currently, many highly educated Turkish engineers and scientists are forced 
to seek employment in foreign countries. One reason for this is that Turkey's manufacturing 
and research infrastructure does not provide work. Employment in the technological 
industries operates very similar to the banking industry. Engineers and scientists who reach 
a certain point in their careers, generally leave the company they are employed by and start 
their own companies and hire other engineers and scientists. This has a pyramid effect, the 
more employed engineers and scientists in the infrastructure, the more employment that there 
will be available to engineers and scientists in the infrastructure. 
b. Industrialization 
The defense industry requires many technologies for the leading edge 
equipment used by the Turkish Armed Forces. These technologies require support industries 
as suppliers to the primary manufacturer. These support industries can also support civilian 
industry in Turkey. The support industries are more likely to lead to the development of a 
civilian industrial infrastructure than the primary manufacturer of the defense system. In 
Figure 5 is an illustration of the projected and current support requirements for Turkey's 
aircraft manufacturing sector.36 It is displayed as a function of a number of people employed 
in support of each aircraft manufacturer. 
1991 Sanayi Kongresi 
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c.        Research and Development 
In the initial stages of a project before an engineering design is complete, high 
technology companies provide research and development funds to universities. In the final 
stages of a product some manufacturers will use a university to test and evaluate the design 
of the equipment. This infrastructure is very important to the development of an independent 
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Figure 5. Employment in the Aircraft Industry of Turkey. 
d.        Development of Modern Quality Control Techniques 
The local production of high technology military equipment will require 
Turkey to acquire the quality control techniques currently used in the United States and 
Western Europe. Turkey's domestic industry needs these techniques to remain competitive 
in world trade. 
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e.        Development of New Management Techniques 
New management techniques are more efficient and produce a more efficient 
workforce. The production of very technical equipment requires a very well educated 
workforce rather than the normal Turkish workforce which is hired to perform repetitive 
tasks requiring little training. The management of highly trained personnel emphasizes 
techniques that leave as much of the production operation as possible in the hands of the 
workers. Generally, the structure for these operations only meets the minimum required 
communication links in order to achieve the production of the equipment. This management 
method is designed to achieve maximum innovation and loyalty from the production worker. 
The time when just the ability to produce a product guaranteed the ability to sell it 
somewhere in the world, is long past. In order for the product to be used, it must be of very 
high quality or have some innovative feature that makes it unique in the world. 
/ Raising Competitiveness of Turkish Industry in International 
Markets 
In order to be competitive in the world requires more than just a low labor 
rate. It requires high quality production, unique products, and the lowest possible production 
cost. Labor is not the most important factor in production costs. It is only the most important 
factor in low technology manufacture. In the high technology engineering, the cost of design 
and research is much higher than the final production cost. 
D.        SUMMARY 
Turkey must modernize its military forces to meet the real threats in its unstable 
region of the world. The economic situation of Turkey dictates that as much of these 
modernization capital as possible be spent inside Turkey. As any frugal consumer, Turkey 
also requires that it receive the maximum benefit from the technology acquired with the 
purchase of this military equipment. Maximum benefit in terms of civilian industry is 
increased employment, new world markets, and raise the quality of manufacturing inside 
Turkey. The simplest means of offsetting the cost of modernization would be for Turkey to 
enter the business of producing weapons for other countries. The long term difficulty of this, 
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is that other countries also realize that their defense costs should be spent internally and the 
market for arms is decreasing. Additionally, the countries in the world that produce arms 
(United States, Russia and Western Europe) are busily decreasing the size of their armed 
forces, and their own arms manufacturers are also in competition for the world arms market. 
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III. TURKISH DEFENSE ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The last chapter discussed the factors driving Turkey's new defense policy. This 
chapter examines the implementation of the new policy. To implement its new defense 
policy, it was necessary for the government of Turkey to establish a new organization. The 
Undersecretariat for Defense Industry was established with Public Law 3238 (Appendix) in 
1985 and is responsible for the direction, control and financing of the modernization of the 
Turkish Armed Forces. The Undersecretariat for Defense has also been tasked with the 
privatization of the Turkish defense industries and programs to encourage private industry 
to support Turkey's defense infrastructure. Turkey levied a special tax in addition to the 
normal government budgeting functions for the modernization of the armed forces. The first 
part of this chapter discusses the functioning of the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries 
and the challenges that Turkey must overcome in order to develop a robust defense 
infrastructure. This section discusses Turkish strategy for the development of its defense 
infrastructure. The final portion of the chapter discusses the current and ongoing defense 
projects administered by the Undersecretariat under the new defense policy. 
B. UNDERSECRETARIAT FOR DEFENSE INDUSTRIES (SSM) 
SSM is responsible for all contracting related to investments in Turkey's defense 
infrastructure and the reorganization of the existing industrial base to support the 
modernization of policies of Turkey. Additionally, SSM prioritizes projects in relation to the 
needs of the Turkish Armed Forces and the resources available from the government and the 
special tax levied to support modernization. SSM is responsible for monitoring defense 
contracts to ensure that the terms are met. Article 10 of the Public Law that established the 
Undersecretariat sets the organization's responsibilities as follows: 
• Implement the decisions taken by the Executive Committee. 
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• Award contracts on orders for procurement programs to be established annually 
on the basis of projects. 
• Re-organize and integrate the existing national industry so as to satisfy defense 
industry requirements, encourage new enterprises and channel them according to 
the integration and requirements, seek possibilities for foreign capital and 
technology contribution, guide enterprises and make plans for state participation 
in this respect. 
• Determine procurement programs and funding models by taking into 
consideration the funding sources. 
» Make plans for production, at private and public organizations, of modern 
//eapons, material and equipment required. 
• Support, when necessary; private, public or compound investments provided that 
they are export oriented. 
• Make researches and develop material and equipment for modern weapons, 
produce prototypes; make advance payments; regulate long term orders and other 
financial and economic incentives. 
• Make contracts covering the conditions of the purchase to be made in the up- 
coming years in accordance with the specifications, and technical and financial 
issues considering specifications and standards to be determined by the Ministry 
of National Defense. 
• Co-ordinate off-set and the export of defense industry products. 
• Award credit from the Fund or get credit loan from local and foreign sources and, 
when necessary, set up companies with domestic and foreign capital, and 
participate as such. 
• Control as to whether or not the goods produced are in conformity with contract 
terms, and whether or not the quality assurance and contract terms are fulfilled. 
• Assist in resolving the problems encountered in the implementation of the 
contract between the private and public parties concerned.37 
1. Decisionmaking Organization 
The Defense Industries Supreme Coordination Board is chaired by the Prime Minister 
and consists of the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, cabinet members and the commander of 
each armed services, and   is responsible for policy, planning and the coordination of 
Law Concerning Defense Industry, Law No: 3238 Legislation Date: 7.11.1985, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of 
National Defense Undersecretariat for Defense Industry, (Ankara, 1993), 6. 
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decisions related to National Defense. This board provides coordination of all government 
activities related to defense industries and sets the overall policies of the government in the 
purchase and production of defense equipment. (Figure 5) 
The Defense Industries Executive Committee makes the final decision on all projects 
related to defense. The Chairman of the committee is the Prime Minister and the committee 
is made up of the Minister of National Defense and the Chief of the General Staff. (Figure 
6) 
The Undersecretary for Defense Industry is tasked from the defense industries 
executive committee and the Minister of National Defense with the priorities and 
requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces. This tasking is a result of policy decisions made 
by the defense industry supreme coordination board, the armed forces and the civilian 
government. In Figure 6 there is a diagram of the organization of the Undersecretariat For 
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Figure 6. Organization of Committees and SSM. 
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2. Financing 
The financial resources to accomplish the defense industry development policies are 
provided through a special "Defense Industrial Support Fund" managed by SSM and the 
Defense Industries Executive Committee. The primary sources of revenue for the fund: 
• Annual appropriations from The National Budget. 
• Levies and surcharges on the state monopoly products. 
• Revenues from National Lottery, joint bets. 
• Portion of the gasoline sales tax. 
• Withholdings from income and corporate taxes. 
• Revenues from the assets owned by the fund. 
• Revenues from paid military service. 
• Donations.38 
3. Acquisition Process for Defense Projects 
The acquisition of defense equipment begins when the Turkish General Staff 
identifies a requirement for a weapon system. This requirement is added to the Strategic 
Objective Plan (SOP) for the modernization, operational readiness and logistics support for 
the Turkish Armed Forces. The General Staff explicitly defines the technical and tactical 
requirements for the required system. The Minister of National Defense, cognizance of 
policy established in the Defense Industry Supreme Coordination Board, and the 
Undersecretariat for Defense Industries recommends procurement of the system to the 
Defense Industries Executive Committee. 
The Executive Committee is responsible for the final procurement decision and 
determining whether the weapon system will be procured domestically or from a foreign 
source. Additionally, the Executive Committee determines whether the procurement will be 
38
    Constituting A Defense Industry Infrastructure 
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from a foreign company or whether an investment will be made in Turkey's defense 
infrastructure. 
The Executive Committee tasks the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries with the 
acquisition. The Undersecretary establishes a project group to prepare a request for proposals 
and solicits participation from manufacturers. SSM's project team evaluates the proposals 
to see if they meet the requirements originally made by the General Staff. Proposals are also 
evaluated for the following: 
• Technology transfer. 
• Offers for research and development activities in plants and facilities to be 
established in Turkey. 
• Amount of local content. 
• Net flow of foreign currency abroad. 
• Provides opportunity for sales to third countries. 
• NATO quality standards. 
• Personnel training. 
• Provisions for financing and credit. 
• High employment potential. 
If the proposal is for an existing system, the system is also tested and evaluated for 
conformity to the requirements of the General Staff. 
The proposals are prioritized by how closely they meet the requirements of the 
General Staff and the evaluation criteria. The Executive Committee then makes a decision 
as to which proposal to accept and whether to negotiate a contract. 
If a contract is accepted, the Undersecretariat establishes a project group to adrninister 
and monitor the contract. (Figure 7) 
C.        CHANNELS FOR TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFER 
Transfer of technology does not automatically take place when equipment is 
purchased or even when equipment is assembled in the receiving country. Turkey has found 
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it necessary to ensure a transfer manufacturing capability and technology by the use of 
offsets when contracting for military equipment. 
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Figure 7. Acquisition Process. 
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1.        Offsets 
Offsets are defined as an exchange between a government and a manufacturer in 
compensation to the government for the purchase of the equipment from the manufacturer. 
Offsets are "indirect offsets" when they are not related to the purchased equipment. Offsets 
are "direct offsets" when they are related to the government purchase. Turkey uses both 
direct and indirect offsets to accomplish its goals of developing domestic defense 
infrastructure. Table 2 lists some of the current projects administered by SSM and the direct 
and indirect offsets to Turkey in U.S. dollars, for the life of the project.39 




Armored Combat Vehicle Project 332,000,000 248,000,000 
F-16 Electronic Warfare Systems Project 0 225,000,000 
HF/SSB Radios Project 34,340,000 119,935,000 
Basic Training Aircraft Project 0 3,000,000 
Command-Control-Communication (C3) Systems 25,000,000 0 
Mobile Radar Project 23,180,000 40,000,000 
Light Transport Aircraft Project 342,200,000 135,000,000 
ACV Cupola 6,474,000 19,422,000 
ACV Engine 31,000,000 17,904,000 
LTA Engine 41,000,000 14,200,000 
AH-1W Super Cobra 0 19,000,000 
Wheeled Armored Vehicles for the Security Department 13,147,951 13,147,951 
Wheeled Armored Vehicles (small type) for the Security Department 905,160 905,160 
Peace Onyx-II F-16 Engine 133,700,000 256,200,000 
General Purpose Helicopter Project 246,000,000 246,000,000 
F-16 RLG INS 3,700,000 9,700,000 
ACV Gun/Turret 29,142,084 29,142,084 
ACV Night Vision Systems 22,000,000 5,800,000 
Cougar Helicopter 67,500 94,500,000 
Table 2. Direct and Indirect Offset Commitments. 
In order to lessen the cost and burden of the defense industry on the economy offset 
programs are strongly encouraged.   Therefore, Turkey has set strict offset policies for the 
39
   Various unpublished sources from SSM. 
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programs. These policies are published as "Off-Set Guidelines" by the SSM. The Off-Set 
Guidelines establishes rules for every facet of the defense programs. Under the 1992 policy: 
• Offsets must account for at least 30 percent of the value of any project negotiated 
by SSM and the Ministry of National Defense. Additionally, when part of a 
project is imported, offsets must account for at least 50 percent. 
• In the case of co-production in Turkey, at least 50 percent of the offset must be a 
direct offset. Submission of an offset proposal implies an unconditional 
acceptance of the guidelines. 
The policy specifies the manner in which Turkey will credit companies with meeting 
their offset obligations. SSM will assign different values to a company's indirect offsets 
based on a variety of factors, including type of investment, the length of time the investment 
is made, and whether Turkey will be able to export products as a result of the investment. 
a. Joint Ventures 
A joint venture is a direct offset and joint ownership of the manufacturing 
capability for a defense product. This may also include joint ownership of the intellectual 
material and basic research for the development of the project. Turkey only enters into joint 
ventures when the manufacturing plant is built in Turkey and provides an offset of 
employment and the manufacturing capability to produce other products locally. 
b. Co-production 
Co-production is a direct offset where the domestic manufacturer receives a 
license to produce a defense product. The license may enable the manufacturer to export the 
product to a third country or may limit the exports to a list of eligible customers. The product 
may be in production in both the licensing country and in Turkey. 
c. Local Content 
Turkey bases the requirements for local content on the level of technology 
being transferred. If the manufacturing technology can be immediately acquired 
domestically, then Turkey requires that there be a high percentage of local content. However, 
if the technology being transferred is a leading edge technology which will require some time 
32 
to produce an infrastructure inside Turkey, then the percentage of local content is set to a 
lower figure. Table 3 shows the local content of some current projects.4 40 







Armored Combat Vehicle Project 881.5 14% 73% 
F-16 Electronic Warfare Systems Project 325.0 14% 
HF/SSB Radios Project 163.2 18.6% 51.8% 
Basic Training Aircraft Project 17.0 $ 4.49 Million 
Command-Control-Communication (C3) Systems 163.1 $45.1 Million 
Mobile Radar Project 150.5 $ 34.6 Million 
Light Transport Aircraft Project 550.0 $85.1 Million 
ACV Cupola 33.2 $11.6 Million 
ACV Engine 145.7 58% 
Table 3. Targeted Local Content. 
2. Research and Development 
Fourteen research and development projects related to the defense industry have been 
awarded for a total of 30 million U.S. dollars to Turkish universities ( See Table 4),41 
research institutes and some private sector establishments. Research and development 
performed in Turkey's research and development establishment provides both employment 
for Turkish scientists and engineers and creates an innovative sector to support defense and 
civilian production. In order for Turkey to realize returns from the export of military 
equipment, Turkey must produce innovative and market timely products to compete with the 
large manufacturers of Western Europe and the United States. 
40
 Various unpublished sources from SSM. 
41
 Various unpublished sources from SSM. 
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3. Summary 
Turkey prefers the joint venture method of offsets because there is a higher likelihood 
that technology and manufacturing techniques will be transferred to the defense and civilian 
sectors of Turkey's economy. 
Project 
PRC/VRC 9600 Series Frequency Hopping 
Radio 
Development 
PCTE Portable Common Test Equipment 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UAV-XI 
Liquid Fuel RAMJET Engine Development 
Composit Armored Production 
Silicon Carbide Based Ceramic Material 
Production 
Software and Hardware Development for 
National Defense Systems 
Research Organization 
ASELSAN Inc. 
STFA SAVRONIK Inc. 
TAI Inc. 
METU Middle East Technical University 
ITU Istanbul Technical University 
METU 





S 242,000+176 MTL 
S 765,000+170 MTL 
$ 530,000+476 MTL 
$1,070,000+137 MTL 
Milimetric Wave Electronic Warfare METU $1,059,463+403 MTL 
Semiconductor Technologies Research 
Center 
BILKENT University $3,100,000 
Short and Medium Range Rockets 
Technologies Development 
TUBITAK7SAGE 
Uzun Ufuk (1st phase) TUBITAK/MAM 
Guided Rocket Development Infrastructure 
(GUFTAG) 
ROKETSAN Inc. 
$ 2,598,000+2,600 MTL 
$ 500,000+3,500 MTL 
$ 1,850,000 
Uzun Ufuk (2nd phase) ITUV/SAM 
'Table as of 1993 
$ 1,850,000 
Table 4. Research and Development Funding. 
D. ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Some of the factors that affect Turkey's ability to increase the defense and civilian 
industrial infrastructure are economic. These factors restrict the growth of Turkey's economy 
and limit the foreign exchange that Turkey may invest in modernization. 
34 
1. Switching to Liberal Economy 
The major change in the economic policy of Turkey, since the beginning of 1980s has 
been to reduce the role of the government in economic and commercial activities and to 
confine the government to infrastructure investments. In order to achieve this goal, the 
necessary measures have been taken to encourage and support the private entrepreneurs; 
trade restrictions, exchange and price controls have been abandoned; and perhaps more 
importantly, the inflow of foreign capital has been made easier as well as the outflow of 
Turkish capital by Turkish investors. The idea underlying all these measures is to gradually 
transform the economic structure which had been based on government leadership into fully 
market oriented economy where free enterprise and competition are the essential forces 
driving the economy. 
Turkey had a government controlled economy until the end of 1985. Turkish private 
industry was not able to enter the defense field as well as the other government monopolies. 
Additionally, large publicly owned companies were suffering financial difficulties and 
required new investments to remain viable. Investment in these companies by foreigners had 
been either prohibited or strictly regulated. To overcome this problem, the government 
established a liberalized policy. This policy was directed at creating a more modern defense 
industry in Turkey. The primary method was by allowing the Turkish private sector to 
collaborate with foreign manufacturers, and acquire technology, management know-how and 
capital. 
2. Inflation 
Turkey has invested heavily in the development of Eastern Turkey with dams and 
powerplants (GAP)42. This has led to inflation on the order of 70-80 percent. Additionally, 
high inflation in Turkey is caused by the State Economic Enterprises (SEE) which have at 
times required subsidies of up to 13 percent of the national budget. 
Although internally the effects of the inflation are reduced with the usual tools, price 
freezes, money restrictions and the freezing of wages or pay raises, the exchange rate for the 
42
   Giineydogu Anadolu Projesi - Southeastern Anatolia Project 
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Turkish lira shows the full effects of inflation. This prevents Turkey from borrowing money 





Figure 8. Exchange Rate Turkish Lira to U.S. Dollar. 
The Defense Industry Support Fund (DISF) has been particularly hard hit by the 
effects of Turkey's inflation. In the last few years the DISF has experienced large deficits 
primarily due to the high inflation. Recently, the National Assembly redesigned the tax 
source for the fund so that it would parallel inflation better. Additionally, the Turkish Armed 
Forces are not compelled to acquire weapons through the SSM and this accounts for large 
expenditures of foreign exchange reserves for the purchase of defense equipment. Ninety 
percent of this expenditure is in U.S. dollars and represents a severe drain on the Turkish 
economy. 
43
   OECD, OECD Economic Surveys of Turkey 1993-1994, Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 1994, 130. 
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3. International Arms Trade 
The easiest method in the 1980s to realize a return on the investment in defense 
industries was to sell arms to Iraq and Iran. This was demonstrated by the Western European 
countries in the 1980s. The 1980s left the impression that it was possible for a country to 
support its defense establishment by producing weapons for the international market. This 
is in contrast to the normal purpose before that time of using the arms trade to support allies 
and gain influence in other countries. The realities of today's world, are that there is a 
shrinking market for arms and the United States and Western Europe are competing fiercely 
for that market. With these conditions in mind, it is unlikely that developing countries will 
gain any significant percentage of the international market for arms and must, instead, rely 
on the technological and management techniques gained in the civilian sector by production 
in its defense sector. 
In order for Turkey to support the modernization of the armed forces, it is necessary 
for the defense industry to export and bring foreign exchange into Turkey. In the paragraph 
above, it can be seen that it is difficult for Turkey to compete with the large Western 
European and United States manufacturers. Therefore, Turkey is following a policy of joint 
ventures with these large companies. There are two advantages to a joint venture in this 
context, first, the large firm is not a competitor but a partner in the operation. Second, more 
subtle, is that when the system goes out of production, Turkey may be able to act as a source 
of supply for spare parts and maintenance for equipment that is no longer supported by the 
large firm. 
E.        TECHNICAL FACTORS 
Turkey is an industrialized country with an industrial and service sectors making up 
approximately 75 percent of the economy. However, this industrial base does not support the 
new defense technologies that Turkey wishes to acquire. 
37 
1. Quality Control 
NATO military equipment must be produced to specifications outlined in the Allied 
Quality Assurance Publications (AQAP).44 Building equipment to these specifications, will 
require the supporting industries inside Turkey to upgrade their quality control to meet the 
NATO standards. This will have the side effect of improving the quality of manufactured 
equipment for both the domestic and international markets. Even though most weapon 
systems are limited production runs and will not represent the normal production of the 
supporting manufacture, the manufacturer will still have established a quality control 
operation in the manufacturing plant that will be carried over to the normal production. An 
additional factor driving this process, is the requirements for a certain percentage of local 
content in a joint venture. The joint venture company is compelled to train the supporting 
manufacturers to bring them up to meeting the NATO specification. In some contracts, in 
order to meet the local content requirements the manufacturer has provided to the 











NATO Requirements For An Industrial Quality Control System 
NATO Inspection System Requirements For Industry 
NATO Basic Inspection Requirements For The Industry 
Quality System Requirements 
Inspection System Requirements 
Engineering Management 
Manufacturing Management 
Table 5. Important NATO and MIL Specifications. 
TMMOB Makina Miihendisleri Odasi, 1991 Sanayi Kongresi: Savunma Sanayii Sektor Raporu (Ankara- 
November 1991). 
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2. Technical Infrastructure 
The requirements to produce even what may be considered a simple or insignificant 
component of equipment can become very intricate and involve many technologies. For 
example, to join two pieces of aluminum together requires the engineer to understand the 
specifications for the joint and the procedure he will need to certify that the joint is properly 
made. It also requires a technician who is skilled at welding the joints, another technician 
who is skilled at building the jigs to align the joints, and another technician who is skilled 
at x-raying and testing the joints. The technology required is helium oxide welding which 
requires its own support structure of qualified people to test containers for the oxygen and 
helium, refill bottles, and repair the helium arc equipment. Interwoven in all of this, are 
numerous support people who must know where to buy the components involved in the 
manufacture, and in the equipment used to manufacture the weld. 
To build a robust infrastructure for defense manufacturing, Turkey must develop an 
infrastructure of people, equipment and small businesses to support the operations like the 
one described in the preceding paragraph. Up until this time, most manufacturing in Turkey 
has been done with the idea that everything needed for production would have to be provided 
for by the manufacturer. This method of manufacture produced self-sufficient industries but 
these industries were less efficient and tended to retard the development of supporting 
manufacturers. 
3. Scale of Manufacture and Amortizing Costs 
Defense equipment is usually manufactured in limited quantities. One of the factors 
that contributes to the high cost of defense equipment is that the research and development 
cost for the equipment must be paid for with the production run. Additionally, even after 
equipment is designed it is sometimes not economically feasible for the manufacturer of the 
supporting equipment to manufacture that equipment. If a small manufacturer must tool up 
for a limited run, the cost of tooling up will also have to be amortized over his production 
run. Even in the United States unique parts for unique equipment sometimes exceeds the 
economic cost of completely replacing the original equipment. 
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For the small manufacturers used to support in joint ventures, the purpose of the 
limited production run is to gain management techniques, manufacturing capability, and 
experience that can be moved to the civilian sector of the economy. 
F.        JOINT VENTURES 
SSM has managed approximately four and one half billion U.S. dollars in projects 
for the Turkish Armed Forces. These include more than twenty joint ventures. Some of 
which are outlined in the following paragraphs. 
1.        Armored Combat Vehicle (ACV) 
This is the first project awarded by SSM. The project was to produce 1698 armored 
vehicles in four configurations for the Turkish Armed Forces. The project is a joint venture 
between FMC of the United States and NUROL of Turkey. The first deliveries from the 
Turkish facility were made in 1991. The total project cost was 880 million dollars in 1986 
dollars. Contracts awarded for manufacture in Turkey for sub-components of the vehicle 
include the engine and transmission, a Turkish designed cupola for the vehicle, a gun turret 
for replacing the original designed turret, and a night vision system, manufactured in Turkey 
in conjunction with Texas Instruments.45 
2. F-16 Electronic Warfare Systems Project 
This project was contracted in 1989 to produce 122 active and 160 passive units of 
the ALQ-178 (V3) electronic warfare set for the Turkish Air Force. The project is a joint 
venture between Loral of the United States and Kavala of Turkey. The project has delivered 
101 passive and 74 active systems. The total cost of the project is 325 million dollars.46 
3. HF/SSB Radios Project 
This project was contracted in 1989 to produce 2,936 jamming-resistant and 
frequency-hopping radios. The project is a joint venture between Marconi of the United 
Ministry of National Defence Undersecretariat For Defence Industries, Turkish Defence Industry Products 
Catalogue, (Ankara: 1995) 11-14. 
Ibid. 125 
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Kingdom and three Turkish companies: Has, Cihan and Elit. The project has delivered 1,390 
radios to the Turkish Armed Forces. The total cost of the project is 163.2 million dollars.47 
4. Basic Training Aircraft 
This project was to produce thirty-four SF-260D basic training aircraft in Turkey with 
the purchase of six initial aircraft from Agusta of Italy. This is a co-production contract 
between Agusta of Italy and TAI of Turkey, a 51 percent publicly owned company with the 
majority of the remaining stock owned by Lockheed of the United States The project was 
completed in June 1995 with a delivery of forty aircraft to the Turkish Armed Forces. The 
total cost of the project was 17 million dollars.48 
5. Mobile Radar Complex Project 
This project was to produce fourteen long range 3D search radars and eighteen 
command, control and communication (C3) systems. The production is under two separate 
contracts, the first between Tekfen of Turkey and Thomson-CSF of France and AYESAS 
of Turkey a joint venture to produce the 3D radar and the second between Ay din Corporation 
of the United States and AYMET the Turkish subsidiary to produce the C3 system. Seven 
units of the long range radar have been delivered to the Turkish Armed Forces, four produced 
in France and three in Turkey. The total cost of the project is 313.5 million dollars. 
The software for the integration of the C3 system and the 3D radar is being developed 
by Unysis of the United States and is currently undergoing testing for acceptance.49 
6. Light Transport Aircraft Project 
This project was contracted in 1990 to co-produce 52 CN-235 transport aircraft It 
is a joint project between CAS A of Spain and TAI of Turkey. The contract has produced 
twenty-one aircraft for the Turkish Armed Forces. The total cost of the project was 550 
million dollars. Currently there is an ongoing project for the improvement of the Inertial 
Navigation System of the delivered aircraft.50 
47
 Ibid. 55 
48
 Ibid. 115 
49
 Ibid. 127 
50
 Ibid. 114 
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G.       SUMMARY 
This chapter has covered the implementation of the new defense policy and the 
government organization SSM that was established by the Turkish National Assembly with 
the goals of improving the domestic defense infrastructure. In Section F, this chapter has 
outlined briefly some of the projects managed by SSM. 
In recent months, Turkey has postponed other planned projects, notably the co- 
production of the Blackhawk helicopter. This is brought on by economic factors inside 
Turkey and immediate requirements by the Turkish Armed Forces. This is not a policy 
change, but simply an economic decision. It is initially less expensive to purchase equipment 
than to manufacture it, but in the long run, Turkey needs the defense industrial infrastructure 
to not only manufacture equipment but to maintain it in operation. 
Of the six projects outlined, the armored combat vehicle demonstrates the goals of 
SSM for the transfer of technology and the increase the domestic defense infrastructure. In 
the next chapter, the author will analyze the armored combat vehicle project for its 
effectiveness in transferring technology and know-how to the civilian manufacturing sector. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW POLICY 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes one project, the armored combat vehicle. This joint venture will 
be used to answer the research question: how successful is the new government defense 
policy been in regard to the transfer of technology to the civilian industrial section of 
Turkey? 
There are a number of reasons for selecting this project for analysis: 
• This is the first project undertaken by SSM. Because the project has been 
managed by SSM since 1986, it has a significant history for analysis. 
• This is the largest project managed by SSM in financial terms and represents the 
largest investment by Turkey in the new defense policy. 
• This project has evolved over time from an operation involving one company and 
one contract administered by SSM to a manufacturing operation involving many 
supporting companies and many contracts. 
• This project has the highest local content commitment of the projects administered 
by SSM. 
This chapter begins with a brief history of the armored combat vehicle project and 
a description of the joint venture projects for producing the vehicle. The following sections 
of the chapter will answers the questions that indicate whether the policy is successful as 
outlined in first chapter. Turkey: 
• has acquired technology and management capabilities? 
• has acquired new markets? 
• has acquired a permanent industrial base? 
• has reduced the cost of equipping and maintaining Turkey's Armed Forces? 
• has maximized the use of existing capabilities? 
The final section will be a summary of the results of the analysis. 
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B.        ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLE PROJECT 
The project began in 1988 when SSM awarded a contract jointly to FMC of the 
United States and NUROL of Turkey. The contract was for a joint venture company (FNSS) 
to produce 1698 armored vehicles of four types. The four types of vehicles were the armored 
infantry fighting vehicle (AIFV), the advanced armored personnel carrier (AAPC), the 
armored mortar vehicle (AMV), and the armored tow vehicle (ATV). 
A manufacturing plant was built in Golbasi-Ankara, Turkey and the first deliveries 
from the plant were realized in 1991. Over time, the contract has been modified with 
production of the engine/transmission, the cupolas, the gun and turrets, and the night vision 
system being supplied by other joint ventures instead of the original contractor. In 1991, 
during the Gulf War, Switzerland announced an embargo of the 25 mm cannon used in 
production of the AIFV version which led to a modification and an alternate source for the 
vehicle's cannon. Additionally, the AAPC version was modified to protect the gunner under 
combat conditions. In order to meet the requirements of the Turkish Army, the original 
design of a 265 HP engine was replaced with a 300 HP engine, this upgrade required a 
modification to the transmission and led to redesign of the steering system. The night vision 
system for the vehicles was also upgraded. 
To date, 1027 vehicles have been produced by FNSS and 663 vehicles have been 
delivered to the Turkish Armed Forces. The primary reason for the difference between 
produced and delivered is that subsystem deliveries from subcontractors are not coordinated 
with the scheduled deliveries to the Turkish Armed Forces. 
C.        LOCAL CONTENT 
Local content requirements in a contract guarantee that a targeted percentage of the 
product will be produced in Turkey. The purpose of local content requirements is to ensure 
that the defense infrastructure in Turkey will receive the technology and capabilities needed 
to support the manufacturing of, in this case, the armored fighting vehicle. These 
requirements should result in a permanent manufacturing base. 
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1. Acquired Technology and Management Capabilities 
Local content ensures that the support industries acquire the capabilities needed to 
produce components and subcomponents of the vehicle to NATO specifications. The 
contracts require the manufacturer of the vehicle to ensure that a certain percentage of the 
equipment is manufactured inside Turkey. This has led to the manufacturer recruiting 
subcontractors and even on occasion training and capitalizing them to meet the requirements 
of the contract. 
The realities of modern manufacturing are that a manufacturer becomes as specialized 
as possible to ensure an efficient operation. To build a defense infrastructure, Turkey must 
construct a pyramid of supporting companies to support a major defense project. In the case 
of this project, FNSS is supported by 86 independent subcontractors. A large percentage of 
these companies came into existence with this project. Because these companies are civilian 
companies, Turkey would expect that they would find a market for their acquired expertise 
in both the defense and civilian economy. The companies that existed prior to the contract 
have received expertise relating to quality control and building higher quality components. 
Figure 9 shows the technological areas in which the support companies have expertise.51 
2. Local Content Targets 
SSM monitors the local content of the contracts that it administers. This is an ongoing 
process and SSM compiles statistics on a monthly basis. These statistics develop three 
figures. The first number developed is the components that are supplied from Turkey to fulfil 
in the case of the fighting vehicle contract the 73 percent local content target. The second 
number compiled represents components that are expected to be produced in Turkey in the 
near future. The third number represents components which SSM believes cannot be 
produced in Turkey at this time. Figure 10 shows the numbers of components in the armored 
fighting vehicle project used in meeting the 73 percent target.52 
Over time, the number of components that make up the vehicle has increased due to 
modifications and the nature of sourcing material locally. When material is purchased 
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locally, the subcontractor may supply only a subset of the original component with other 









Figure 9. Technological Expertise of Support Companies. 
Components which are expected to be supplied in the near future are components 
which are in prototype or awaiting certification for meeting the specifications. Components 
which are in the category of not possible at this time, are components that need either 
licensing for manufacture or require raw material or parts from outside Turkey. SSM 
coordinates with the manufacturer and actively attempts to find methods to reduce the 
quantity of parts in the category of "not possible at this time." 
3. Current Local Content 
The components that currently meet the local content requirements of the contract can 
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Figure 10. Components Used in Meeting the 73% Requirement. 
• Subcontractor manufactured components - these are components which are 
manufactured by a subcontractor from material and documentation supplied by 
FNSS. An example would be machine shop subcontracted to machine armor plate 
used in the manufacture of the armored combat vehicle. 
• Subcontractor supply components - these are components which are manufactured 
by the subcontractor or components that are supplied locally. An example of this 
would be Kale Inc. who produces the water cooling radiators used in the vehicle. 
This category also includes standard parts which are readily available from the 
civilian sector. 
• FNSS manufactured components - these are components produced locally by 
FNSS. 
Figure 11 shows the breakdown of locally produced components that make up the 73 percent 
requirement that are currently being produced in Turkey.53 Currently, 78 percent of the 
53
   Various unpublished sources from SSM. 
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required has been met for local content and this makes up approximately 60 percent of the 
components used in the vehicle. 
S    200 
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Figure 11. Locally Produced Components. 
4. Sources of Material 
The local content requirement for the vehicle is for components that amount to 73 
percent of the vehicle at the end of the contract. From an economic view, it would be better 
for the raw material that makes up these components to also be obtained in Turkey. In fact, 
at the end of production about 50 percent of the material used in production will be 
manufactured in Turkey. 
Material for manufacturer is imported from outside of Turkey for one of two reasons. 
Either the material cannot be produced currently in Turkey or it is not feasible to produce that 
material because of the small numbers of vehicles do not economically justify the creation 
of an industry to support their manufacturer. These kinds of economics are a problem for all 
military production. Generally, the production of military equipment is of small numbers by 
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the standards of the civilian economy and the artificial nature of the manufacture's customer 
(government) does not generate a self-sustaining economically viable company. 
Figure 12 depicts the ratio of imported material to locally supplied material used to 
manufacture the vehicle.54 The production units are shown from 300 units in 1991 to 900 
units at the beginning of 1995. As more units were produced, local content raised from 
approximately 60 major components to over 200. 
250 -, 
300 375 450 525 600 
Produced Units 
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Figure 12. Imported Material/Local Material. 
D. NEW MARKETS 
The production of the armored combat vehicles and modifications that were 
developed in Turkey has led to opportunities in export markets. An example and the most 
sophisticated is to replace a similar turret on a Korean infantry fighting vehicle. Additionally, 
54
   Various unpublished sources from SSM. 
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FNSS has developed extensive modification for the M-l 13. This development was a directly 
result of the need for a larger engine in the armored combat vehicle. 
1.        Defense Market 
a.        M113 Upgrade 
The armored combat vehicle shares 60 percent of its parts with the American 
made M-l 13. The M-l 13 is very common and found in many areas in the world. Recently, 
FNSS has actively marketed its modifications and upgrades in North Africa and the Middle 
East. FNSS will probably be able to market the higher horse power engine upgrade of the 
vehicle. This modification to the M-l 13 is supported by many of the subcontractors of FNSS 
and indicates that the armored combat vehicle project has produced a viable defense 
infrastructure able to acquire new markets and enough innovation to compete in the world's 
arms market. Table 6 shows the subcontractors and the modifications to the M-l 13 that were 
designed and developed in Turkey.55 
With this upgrade to the M-l 13, Turkey may be able to find a market for 
upgrading and refurnishing the M-l 13. The M-l 13 is out of production in the United States. 
The American producer is supported by the General Dynamics Service Company but has 
indicated that this support will end sometime in the late 1990s. There are approximately 8000 
M-l 13s in the Mediterranean and Middle East region which could provide a market for 
Turkish defense industry. Figure 13 shows the location of the M-l 13s most likely to provide 
a source of foreign currency to the Turkish defense industry.56 
b.        Special Configurations of the Armored Combat Vehicle 
FNSS produces three special configurations of the armored combat vehicle 
intended solely for export. These are: armored mortar vehicle model II and model III, and 
the armored infantry fighting vehicle Model II. To date, FNSS has not found a market for 
55 Ministry of National Defence Undersecretariat For Defence Industries, Turkish Defence Industry Products 
Catalogue 248. 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1993-1994, Brassley 1993, 60-131. 
50 
these vehicles. This is an extremely competitive market with very large manufacturers 
competing for a decreasing market. Additionally, Turkey's natural market in the Middle East 
is experiencing economic difficulties as the result of expenditures during the Gulf War. 
2. Civilian Market 
It is obvious that FNSS is unlikely to find a civilian market for the armored combat 
vehicle; however, many of the subcontractors to FNSS are producing products which do not 
have strictly military application. These supporting companies constitute the actual defense 




208 HP engine and transmission are dismantled and a new 300 HP Detroit Diesel engine 
with Allison cross drive transmission is installed. 
FNSS, KALE Cooling system is modified according to new power pack, the original grill is modified in 





The vehicle is equipped with improved suspension system with new torsion bar, rod arms, 
shock absorbers and idler group. The defective road wheels, sprockets, final drives and 
track shoes are replaced with the new ones. These improvements in the suspension system 
provides more ground clearance and increased safety of the crew and survivability of the 
vehicle. 
FNSS The fuel cell inside the vehicle is dismantled. Two external fuel cells are assembled at the 
rear of the vehicle. The fuel system is changed accordingly, leading to increased safety of 




ACV equivalent NBC system, heater, trim vane, ramp door, grenade launchers, electric 
and communication system, periscopes and bilge pumps are installed to the vehicle. 
FNSS Mounting provisions that accommodate for different types of bolt-on-armor (add-on- 
armor) plates are prepared. 
FNSS During upgrading, the vehicle is stripped down to the bare hull and subjected to 
radiographic inspection of all major weldings. The cracks observed at final drive and idler 
pad areas are repaired prior to above modification work. 
Table 6. M-113 Upgrade. 
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Figure 13. M-113 Upgrade Market. 
a. Engine and Transmission for Armored Vehicles 
TURSAV makes the engine and transmission for the M-l 13 upgrade and for 
the armored fighting vehicles. These engines are licensed from Detroit Diesel and the 
transmission is licensed from GE-Allison. The engines and transmissions have application 
in large trucks and construction equipment. This is a large company and has its own 
pyramid of supporting subcontractors to produce state of the art engine and transmission. 
b. Armored Vehicle Cable Harness System 
SGS-Profilo is an electronics producer that produces the cable harness for the 
armored vehicles. Similar technology can be used in telecommunication and vehicles. 
c. Radiators for Land Vehicles 
KALE makes radiators for the armored combat vehicle and produces many 
kinds of heat exchangers for air, water and oil systems for locomotives, electric generators, 




FTC BESTAS makes military specification quality fasteners for both the 
aerospace industry and the civilian sector of the Turkish industry. This firm was established 
in 1993 to support not only the armored fighting vehicle project, but also the F-16 and light 
transport aircraft. 
e. Bilge Pumps 
TEPAS makes electrical motors, bilge pumps and fans for both the civilian 
and military market. This company produces bilge pumps and ventilation fans for the M-l 13 
and the armored combat vehicle. 
/ Torsion Bars 
PARSAN does steel forging and machining. They produce the torsion bars 
that were induction hardened for use in the suspension system for the armored combat 
vehicle. 
g.        Road Wheels 
JANTAS makes road wheels for military and civilian heavy vehicles. They 
produce the wheels for the armored combat vehicle and from this experience, they developed 
wheels for the M-l 13. 
h.        Engine and Transmission Parts 
PMS makes spare parts. They make parts for the armored combat vehicle's 
engine and transmission they also, produce the carriers (drive gear) for the M-l 13. PMS also 
produces some parts for the aviation industry. 
L Manufacturing Services 
IMTES provides welding expertise, parts for the electronics industry, does 
certified training, and consulting for the defense industry and supporting companies. 
This list of companies does not include many manufacturers who support the 
production of the vehicle. There are a total of 86 companies involved in the vehicle's 
production. Most of these companies are involved in the project because they are small 
companies who can economically provide support. A policy of FNSS is to use small 
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manufacturers whose scale of production matches the scale of FNSS production of the 
armored combat vehicle. 
E.        COST 
The establishment of a manufacturing operation is initially very expensive. 
Additionally, the nature of government funding where the year to year budgetary authority 
is subject to political pressures, makes it difficult for a country to pursue the joint venture 
route. The fact that Turkey has done this, indicates that Turkey wishes to receive a return on 
this policy and that this is not a bureaucratic decision of the government but a policy pursued 
by both government and legislature. 
1. Offsets 
This project includes both direct and indirect offsets. The direct offsets are valued at 
332 million dollars and the indirect offsets are valued at 246 million dollars with a local 
content requirement of 73 percent. The engine transmission has a 31 million dollar direct 
offset and a 20 million dollar indirect offset with a 65 percent local content requirement. 
Additionally, Texas instrument provided a direct offset of 22 million dollars and an indirect 
offset of 6 million dollars for the night vision system with a 47.5 percent local content 
requirement. France's Giat industries has commitments of a direct offset of 116 million and 
indirect offsets of 29 million for the gun and turrets used on the armored infantry fighting 
vehicle version with a 35 percent local content requirement.57 
Most of the indirect offsets have been realized, however, market conditions for this 
type of vehicle has made it difficult for Turkey to receive the direct offsets. These offsets 
reduce the cost of building the vehicles but in order for Turkey to gain the direct offsets, the 
market conditions for the armored vehicle would have to improve. 
Laie Sariibrahimoglu, "Country Briefing Turkey," Jane's Defence Weekly, 11 June 1994,29. 
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2. Life Cycle Cost 
It would be less expensive for Turkey to purchase a similar vehicle directly than the 
method Turkey has chosen as a joint venture. However, the life cycle cost for the armored 
combat vehicle would be greater because all support and parts would have to come from the 
manufacturer of the replacement vehicle. This would use foreign exchange to support a 
defense operation expected to last at least twenty years. 
The initial procurement cost for the vehicle is misleading. The support costs for 
military equipment is much higher than the procurement cost. For example, the initial 
procurement cost for the engine was approximately $30,000, but over the lifetime of the 
vehicle in the author's experience, the engine would be completely replaced three to six 
times depending upon how the vehicle is used. Using figures from a similar United States 
vehicle and taking into account the most common failures on this class of combat vehicles, 
the engine accounts for approximately ten percent of the cost for parts and labor.58 Assuming 
that the engine is replaced three times in the twenty years projected life, then ten percent of 
the cost of the most common failures would be $90,000. Using this interpretation Figure 14 
depicts the cost for the most common failures compared against the procurement cost of the 
vehicle. It can be seen in the figure just the maintenance and labor on the major components 
of the vehicle exceed the procurement cost. 
As surprising as this might be, these support costs do not include: depot support 
costs, operating costs, personnel support and training costs, transportation costs, 
organizational and intermediate maintenance costs, the costs for installations, and other less 
identifiable costs which must all be budgeted in order to support the operation of the vehicle 
over its twenty year life.59 
ss
   B. S. Dhillon, Life Cycle Costing: Techniques, Models and Applications (New York: Gordon and Breach 
Science Publishers, 1989), 255. 
59
   Ibid. p. 48. 
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F.   TECHNOLOGY 
The real technology gained from the production of the armored combat vehicle is the 
integration of systems using system engineering concepts. Almost any technology can be 
purchased as knowledge from some exporting country in the world. However, a real 
technology transfer takes place when the importing country gains experience in using the 
technology in a real engineering project. This project produced engineers, technicians and 
managers who have the experience that can be adopted to new projects. 
This project requires the supporting companies to produce at higher quality standards 
than is normally the case for a civilian Turkish company. In 1991 there were seven 
companies applying AQAP standards in manufacturing in all of Turkey. Today, there are 
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Figure 14. Maintenance and Labor Cost of the Major Components (20 Years). 
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System integration is not the normal manufacturing method in Turkey where large 
government owned companies produced a product from raw material to final assembly with 
few supporting manufacturers. The management of the subcontractors and delivery schedules 
is also a management method gained in this project. Currently, it is more likely that a civilian 
manufacturer will be at the leading edge of technology than a military equipment 
manufacturer. With the end of the Cold War, the large budgets for research and development 
in military technology are disappearing in every country. Therefore, the supporting 
manufacturers in the project are the most important creation for building a domestic defense 
infrastructure in Turkey. 
G.       SUMMARY 
This chapter has been a detailed survey of the armored combat vehicle project. In the 
first section there was a brief history of the project. The next sections covered various aspects 
of the project related to Turkey's new defense policy. 
The requirement that seems to accomplish the most towards a successful policy, is 
local content. This is a direct offset and provided for in all contracts administered by SSM. 
The local content provisions force the Turkish company to build a permanent infrastructure 
by requiring FNSS to recruit and train, if necessary, support companies to meet the local 
content requirements. Normally, FNSS will recruit an existing company in this process 
because the cost of establishing a new company and its equipment is very high. This ensures 
that existing capabilities inside Turkey is used to the maximum extent possible. 
Another direct offset is the licensing of Turkey to sell various technologies to third 
countries. Currently, Turkey has an agreement with Malaysia to provide turrets to replace an 
existing turret on a similar vehicle made in Korea. The most exciting possibility is for FNSS 
and its subcontractors to compete in the market for the upgrade of M-l 13s in the region of 
North Africa and the Middle East. Additionally, the subcontractors involved in this project 
are likely to survive in the civilian market and in fact, many of them, view this project as a 
minor portion of their business. They are involved in other defense projects and actively 
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seeking civilian and foreign markets. This is made possible by the upgrade in their quality 
of production and experience in a major contract. 
The most important technology gained is in management experience by both FNSS 
and the subcontractor. Turkish engineers, technicians, and managers have participated in a 
major project to produce the vehicle and develop modifications for the M-113. This 
experience will be used in Turkey on other projects. As pointed out in Chapter II, engineers 
and scientists will leave FNSS and start their own companies. In the case of this project, that 
process has already begun. 
The initial purchase price of a piece of military equipment is misleading. A piece of 
equipment like the armored combat vehicle will be used over a twenty year period. The 
actual cost of operating and repairing this equipment is more likely to be higher than its 
purchase price. With permanent manufacturing capabilities at FNSS and its subcontractors, 
the major modifications and overhaul of the vehicle will take place inside Turkey with the 
advantage of using less foreign exchange and the additional advantage that the high inflation 
in Turkey will not have the effect of making the repair of the vehicle anymore expensive or 
less expensive than similar equipment maintained in Turkey. 
There are much more advanced projects administered by SSM but the armored 
combat vehicle project has been in place longer, and uses the largest part of budget. The 
other projects result in technological transfer to Turkey but it is difficult to see how these 
projects will transfer this technology to the civilian sector. For example, the F-16 project can 
only be considered a technological transfer and job opportunity. There is no civilian market 
for supersonic aircraft and the size of the aircraft and technologies involved do not meet any 
civilian need. Additionally, very large civilian manufacturers have basically control of the 
aircraft market, even the EC must combine its resources to compete in this market. 
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V. CONCLUSION: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The first chapter examines the background and presents an overview of the SSM 
organization and the new defense policy established by Turkey. Chapter II discusses the 
reasons for the needed upgrade and modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces. Chapter II 
also covers the current economic factors that affect the new defense policy. Chapter III gives 
a detailed description of the new defense policy, SSM and the implementation of the policy. 
Chapter III also includes a brief survey of the current projects that are managed by SSM. 
Chapter IV includes a detailed look at the longest running project at SSM, the armored 
combat vehicle. 
A. FINDINGS 
This study has led the author to the following conclusions: 
• Turkey has decided to modernize its armed forces. Over the past decades, the 
armed forces equipment has become outdated and to be an effective military force, 
in a modern conflict, the equipment must be upgraded. 
• The new defense policy is effective in building a manufacturing infrastructure in 
Turkey but economic considerations and the immediate needs of the armed forces 
have recently resulted in Turkey reequipping its armed forces from direct foreign 
purchase. Although this option is the least costly initially, in the long run this will 
be the more expensive method. 
• The new defense policy is a long-range method of providing Turkey with an 
independent defense industrial capability. In the long run, this method will also 
be less costly. 
• Because the world market for arms is shrinking, it is not possible for Turkey to 
receive any significant income from the sale of arms made in Turkey. Turkey does 
not have large manufacturers to compete with European and American firms. 
Some of the direct offsets in these contracts are in fact worthless in such a 
competitive market. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In view of the conclusions above, the author makes the following recommendations: 
• This new policy is very good for Turkey in the long run. It should be promoted in 
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those terms, immediate cost savings are not possible while an initial investment 
is taking place. Many years down the road with a robust industrial infrastructure, 
Turkey would be able to pursue a more independent foreign policy, be competitive 
in world trade, and have the excess capacity needed to do basic research and 
development of leading edge products. 
• This sort of policy should be planned in infinite detail. Some of the companies 
involved are very small, yet in time, may well be very important to the resulting 
infrastructure. Without a detailed goal, some of the fruits of the policy may simply 
disappear for lack of attention. To have a detailed plan, Turkey must have an 
effective data collection system to both create the plan and monitor results. This 
policy must be continually modified to achieve the best results. 
• Turkey should pursue a policy which will lead to the export of its defense industry 
product. It should offer very liberal terms on loans to other countries to enable 
them to purchase Turkish defense material. Even though this may not be a profit 
making policy, it will lead to a more permanent industrial base and may lead to 
a market in the region of Turkey. This is a very similar procedure followed by the 
major arms producers in the world. For example, the United States will provide 
guarantees on loans to foreign governments in order to sell American-made arms. 
The key to this policy is the transfer of skills and techniques to the civilian sector. 
The civilian sector operates much more efficiently than the defense industry. Additionally, 
this will establish permanent industries supported by the consumers of Turkey and not by 
difficult to acquire foreign exchange and taxes. For example, in the recent news a critical 
component of the F-22 fighter radar system (monolithic integrated circuit) which costs $8000 
when it was exclusively used in the production of the fighter was incorporated in a 
commercial product to warn school bus drivers of unseen children. This brought the price 
of the component down to $2000. It lowered the price of the F-22 radar system from $16 
million dollars to $4 million dollars. This not only demonstrates the cost involved and scale 
of production, but it also demonstrates that defense production is not a profit making sector 
of any economy.60 
60 Pat Cooper, "TRP Setback Fails to Slow Dual-Use Drive", Defense News (May 1, 1995): 10 
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APPENDIX 
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY 
Ministry of National Defence 
Undersecretariat for Defence Industry 
LAW CONCERNING DEFENCE INDUSTRY 
Law No: 3238 Legislation Date: 7.11.1985 
(Revised version by Law No: 3704) 
Ankara-1993 
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LAW CONCERNING ESTABLISHMENT OF DEFENCE INDUSTRY 
DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION AND AMENDMENTS IN 
TWO ARTICLES OF LAW NO. 3670 OF 11 JULY 1939 REGARDING 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL LOTTERY, AND ONE ARTICLE OF LAW 
NO: 3065 OF 25 OCTOBER 1984 
REGARDING VALUE ADDED TAX. 
Law No. 3238 Legislation   Date   : 
7.11.1985 
Official Gazette : 13.11.1989-18927 
Law Revising Law No. 3238 
Law No: 3704 LegislationDate: 
20.3.1991 
Official Gazette : 24.3.1991-20824 
Objective 
ARTICLE 1.- The objective of this Law is to constitute a basis for the development of a 
modern defense industry and to modernise the Turkish Armed Forces. 
Definitions 
ARTICLE 2. - Definitions used in this law refer to the following: 
Board : Defence Industry High Co-ordination Board. 
Committee : Defence Industry Executive Committee. 
Fund : Defence Industry Support Fund. 
Undersecretariat : Undersecretariat for Defence Industry (its Revised version in 
accordance with LawNo:3704' 
Defence Industry Supreme Co-ordination Board 
According to Article 3 of Law No: 3704 dated 20.3.1991; the "Defence Industry Development and Support 
Administration", the "President of the Defence Industry Development and support Administration" and the 
"Administration" Sub-Articles as were employed in Law No.3238 dated 7.11.1985, have respectively been 
changed to the "Undersecretariat for Defense Industry", the "Undersecretary for Defence Industry" and the 
"Undersecretariat". 
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ARTICLE 3.- The Defence Industry Supreme Coordination Board, under the Chairmanship 
of the Prime Minister, is comprised of the Chief of General Staff, Minister of State for 
Economic Affairs, Minister of National Defence, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of 
Finance and Customs, Minister of Industry and Commerce, Force Commanders, General 
Commander of the Gendarmerie, Undersecretary to the Prime Ministry, Undersecretary of 
the State Planning Organisation and Undersecretary of the Treasury and Foreign Trade. 
The Board shall convene at least twice a year upon call by the Prime Minister. 
Functions of the Board 
ARTICLE 4. - The functions of the Board are as follows: 
a) Plan and co-ordinate the overall strategy in line with the Council of Ministers approval 
and, issue regulatory directives. 
b) Determine the manner of procurement of weapon systems, material and equipment to be 
procured through the Fund in conformity with the Strategic Target Plan set out by the 
Turkish General Staff. 
Defense Industry Executive Committee 
ARTICLE 5.- Defense Industry Executive Committee, under the chairmanship of the Prime 
Minister, is composed of the Chief of General Staff and the Minister of National Defence. 
The Committee shall convene upon call by the Prime Minister. The Undersecretary for 
Defence Industry shall act as the Secretary of the Committee. 
Functions of the Committee 
ARTICLE 6.- The functions of the Committee are as follows: 
a) Take decisions in line with the overall strategy and principles of the Supreme 
Coordination Board set up to promote the defense industry, 
b) Take decisions in accordance with the Strategic Target Plan regarding the domestic 
production and if necessary the out of country procurement of modem weapons, material and 
equipment for the Turkish Armed Forces, 
c) Seek possibilities, provide guidance and follow up plans for the public and private sector 
to establish production facilities with the contribution of foreign capital and technology to 
produce defense oriented goods; when necessary, take decisions in principle for State 
participation in the foundation of such facilities, 
d) Issue instructions to the Undersecretariat for Defence Industry concerning research, 
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development, prototype production, advance payments, long term orders and other financial 
and economic incentives for modern weapons, material and equipment to be obtained, 
e) Take decisions on the export of defense industry goods and off-set trade and mutual 
commercial activities, 
f) Undertake co-ordination activities between organisations concerned in defense industry, 
g) Determine the principles in which the Fund is to be utilised. 
Undersecretariat for Defence Industry 
ARTICLE 7.- The Undersecretariat for Defence Industry has been established as an 
organisation attached to the Ministry of National Defence and possesses a legal personality. 
(Revised version in accordance with Article 1 of Law No:3704.) 
Except for Department Heads who will be appointed upon the Undersecretary's 
recommendation or approval of Minister of National Defence, the Undersecretariat shall 
employ personnel in accordance with the Statutory Decree No. 2451 dated 23.4.1981 with 
the approval of the Undersecretary. The Undersecretary can delegate this authority to his 
subordinate. (Revised version in accordance with Article 1 of Law No:3704) 
Personnel Regime 
ARTICLE 8.- The personnel of the Undersecretariat is subject to the provisions of Civil 
Servants LawNo.657 dated 14.7.1965. 
Contractual personnel 2can be employed provided that their status and the status of the office 
Physician is assigned in accordance with Article 59 of the Civil Servants Law No.657 dated 
14.7.1965. The said personnel, if they so desire, may be linked to the Pension Fund of the 
Republic of Turkey. In this context, those persons who are retired and are employed under 
contract may continue to receive their pensions. (Revised version in accordance with Article 
2ofLawNo:3704) 
Contractual personnel with expertise or special schooling may be employed by the 
Undersecretariat without being subject to the provisions of the Civil Servants Law No.657 
dated 14.7.1965 thereof concerning the employment of personnel under contracts. The 
personnel to be employed in context of this Sub-Article provision shall be linked to or 
associated with the Pension Fund of the Republic of Turkey or with the Social Insurance 
Institution. (Supplementary Sub-Article in accordance with Article 2 of LawNo:3704) 
The number of personnel to be employed in conformity with Sub-Articles 2 and 3, the 
minimum and maximum levels of their salary and their financial rights shall be determined 
Head of Department, Expert, Junior Expert, Legal Adviser, Attorney and Director of Sections (Expert). 
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in accordance with the contractual service principles issued by the Council of Ministers. 
(Supplementary SubArticle in accordance with Article 2 of LawNo:3704) 
The personnel of the Prime Ministry and other Government organisations may be employed 
on leave, without pay or under contractual status at the Undersecretariat. The offices and 
rights pertinent thereof and obligations of such persons shall remain reserved. Their leave 
periods shall be deemed to their actual service in their promotions and retirement, and those 
who have been entitled for promotion during their leave shall be promoted without requiring 
any additional process. 
Budget 
ARTICLE 9.- The budget of the Undersecretariat shall be made up of an amount which does 
not exceed two percent of the Fund. This amount may be increased by a maximum of 50 
percent by the Council of Ministers. 
The Responsibilities of the Undersecretariat 
ARTICLE 10.- The responsibilities of the Undersecretariat are as follows: 
a) Implement the decisions taken by the Executive Committee, 
b) Award contracts on orders for procurement programs to be established annually on the 
basis of projects 
c) Re-organise and integrate the existing national industry so as to satisfy defence industry 
requirements, encourage new enterprises and channel them according to the integration and 
requirements, seek possibilities for foreign capital and technology contribution, guide 
enterprises and make plans for state participation in this respect, 
d) Determine procurement programs and funding models by taking into consideration the 
funding sources, 
e) Make plans for production, at private and public organisations, of modern weapons, 
material and equipment required, 
f) Support, when necessary; private, public or compound investments provided that they are 
export oriented, 
g) Make researches and develop material and equipment for modern weapons, produce 
prototypes; make advance payments; regulate long term orders and other financial and 
economic incentives, 
h) Make contracts covering the conditions of the purchase to be made in the up-coming years 
in accordance with the specifications, and technical and financial issues considering 
specifications and standards to be determined by the Ministry of National Defence. 
i) Co-ordinate off-set and the export of defense industry products, 
j) Award credit from the Fund or get credit loan from local and foreign sources and, when 
necessary, set up companies with domestic and foreign capital, and participate as such, 
k) Control as to whether or not the goods produced are in conformity with contract terms, 
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and whether or not the quality assurance and contract terms are fulfilled, 
1) Assist in resolving the problems encountered in the implementation of the contract 
between the private and public parties concerned, 
Non Applicable Provisions and Precedence 
ARTICLE 11.- The provisions of General Accounting Law No. 1050, State Tender Act No. 
2886, and Supreme Accounting Court Law No. 832 shall not apply to activities and 
transactions anticipated by this law. 
Preparation of the technical specifications and quality assurance services which are a 
requisite by the Undersecretariat shall be carried out by the Ministry of National Defence and 
the Force Commands on the basis of precedence. 
Defense Industry Support Fund 
ARTICLE 12.- The Defence Industry Support Fund has been established in order to realise 
the objective of this Law, at the disposal of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey and 
under control of the Undersecretariat. 
The sources of the Fund are as follows: 
a) Annual appropriations from the State Budget, 
b) Amounts to be fixed at a maximum of 20 times by the Council of Ministers in multiples 
of 50 TL per package, bottle or similar container in sales of all types of alcoholic beverages 
(sparkling wine, vermouth and cinchona wine included; other types of wines and beer 
excluded) and alcohol; and in multiples of 10 TL per package, bottle or similar container in 
sales of cigarettes, cigars, pipe tobacco, rolling tobacco, snuff, leaf tobacco and similar 
tobacco products, beer and other types of wine. (However, the amount to be transferred to 
the Fund shall be considered as expense in computation of the income and corporate tax 
assessment.)3 
c) Transfers to be made from the foundations established for supporting the Turkish Armed 
Forces, 
d) Net revenue of the National Lottery. (Revised version in accordance with Article 48 of 
Statutory Decree No. 320)4 
e) Entire share to be allocated in accordance with Law No. 1473 dated 25.8.1971, and the 
The Council of Ministers has determined the said share to be 200 TL for alcoholic beverages of small bottles, 
400 TL for large bottles and 40 TL per pack for domestically produced cigarettes and 120 TL per pack for 
imported cigarettes. 
According to Article 11 of Law No:3797, the Fund's share consists of the National Lottery Net Revenue, after a 
5% National Olympic Committee Participation Fee is subtracted from the latter. 
66 
entire proceeds obtained from all kinds of pari-mutuels or the amounts to be computed from 
these proceeds on a rate to be determined by the Council of Ministers,5 
f) Transfers to be made on amounts determined by the Council of Ministers from funds 
established 
by laws (tax laws excluded), 
g) The rate to be determined by the Council of Ministers out of the Fuel Consumption Tax 
revenue. (Revised version in accordance with Article 14 of Law No. 3571)6 
h) The share of the Fund paid by income and corporate tax payers and obligors computed out 
of income and corporate tax sum and its ratio thereof shall be determined and allocated. 
(Revised version in accordance with Article 23 of Law No:3824)7 
i) Allocations for modern weapons, material and equipment in the Budget of the Ministry of 
National Defence, 
j) Amount to be allotted to the Housing Development Fund and Defence Industry Support 
Fund by the Council of Ministers from the collections at a maximum rate of 50 percent of 
gross proceeds out of fortune games operated under permission in accordance with Article 
19 of Law of Incentives to Tourism No: 2634, dated 12.3.1992. (However, the amounts paid 
to the Fund through this article shall be considered as expense in computation of income and 
corporate tax rateable value.) 
k) Revenue to be obtained from assets of the Fund, 
1) Revenue to be obtained from the military service compensation fees pursuant to Article 
10 of the Military Service Law No. 1111, 
m) Donations and aids. 
The revenues obtained from sales of real estate belonging to the Ministry of National 
Defence whose service use is no longer required. (Supplementary Sub-Article in accordance 
with Law No: 3357 dated 15.4.1987) 
The principle guidelines with regard to making use the entire or a portion of the arrears of 
the Fund outside the Central Bank of the republic of Turkey is determined by the Council 
of Ministers. (Supplementary Sub-Article in accordance with Article 10 of LawNo:3291 
dated 28.5.1986)8 
The Prime Minister is empowered upon the proposal of the minister who is in charge of the 
Undersecretariat for Treasury and Foreign Trade, to make transfers among funds which have 
In accordance with the Council of Ministers' Decree No: 86/10912 dated 8.8.1986, %10 of the horse race 
pari-mutuel revenues, %7.2 of the Spor-Toto and %14.4 of Spor-Loto revenues are allocated as the Fund share. 
In accordance with the Council of Ministers' Decree No:92/3664 dated 16.10.1992, the Fund's share has been 
determined to be %7.9. 
In accordance with the Council of Ministers' Decree No: 92/3900 dated 19.12.1992, the said share has been 
determined to be t5 of the tax computed as Income & Corporate Tax. 
The Council of Ministers,with Decree No:86/l 1104 dated 15.10.1986, has rendered possible the profitable use 
of arrears of the Fund through purchase of government and treasury bonds and by depositing it into a public 
bank. 
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been established by various Laws and Decrees. The Prime Minister may delegate this 
authority in part or entirely to the Minister in charge of the Undersecretariat for the Treasury 
and Foreign Trade. (Article 11 of LawNo:3291 dated 28.5.1986) 
No share shall be allotted, pursuant to Law No. 2380, to municipalities and local 
governments from the revenues collected and paid to Defence Industry Support Fund by 
public organisations which are included in the General Budget. 
Liability, Declaration, Time and Place of Payment 
ARTICLE 13.- 
1. The parties liable for the payment to the Fund due to delivery of products listed at 
subparagraph b of Article 12 of this Law are the local manufacturers and importers who 
produce or import those products. 
Payments to be made in this manner shall be declared in a Supplementary Tax Return Form 
in accordance with the provisions of the Value Added Tax Law No. 30650 
Exemptions indicated in the Value Added Tax Law No. 3065 shall be valid also for 
implementation of this subparagraph. 
2. The share allocated through Law No. 1473 dated 25.8.1971, and the whole or a portion 
of the amount computed that is to be obtained from all sorts of pari-mutuels, is to be 
collected from legal or real entities who organise the said parimutuels along with the sum 
obtained out of ticket sales. Ensuing the collection process, the amount belonging to the 
Fund shall be declared along with Value Added Tax returns of the related month to the tax 
office and paid concurrently. 
3. (This Sub-Article was abrogated in accordance with Sub-Article 16/6 of LawNo:3571) 
According to Article 6 of Law No: 3571, the amount to be collected from the liable parties 
of the Fuel Consumption Tax and transferred to the Fund in accordance with the Council of 
Ministers' decision in context of the Fuel Consumption Tax to be assessed, shall be declared 
and paid concurrently to the respective tax office ensuing the sales of the the organization 
in question up until the end of the following month. 
4. The amount to be collected in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers 
at a maximum rate of 50 percent of the gross proceeds of fortune games permitted under 
article 19 of the Law of Tourism Incentives No. 2634 dated 12.3.1982, shall be declared and 
paid concurrently by the real or legal entities who operate those establishments, along with 
their Value Added Tax returns to their tax offices. 
5. (This Sub-Article was abrogated in accordance with Sub-Article 26/e of LawNo:3824) 
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Revenue collected by the tax and accounting offices for the Fund is to be transferred to the 
Fund's Account at the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey no later than the end of the 
month succeeding the month in which the said collection has been made. 
Exemptions 
ARTICLE 14.- 
1. The Undersecretariat and the Fund established under the responsibility of the 
Undersecretariat are exempt from: 
a) Corporate Tax. 
b) Inheritance and Succession Tax for grants and donations. 
c) Stamp Duty for all transactions. 
d) Banking and Insurance Transaction Tax on the interest of loans granted. 
2. The provisions of previously existing laws and regulations regarding exemptions on taxes, 
dues and fees applicable for: 
a) The shares of Foundations in various firms, 
b) General Directorate of Defence Ordnance Enterprises and its affiliation, shall continue to 
apply after they are transferred to the Undersecretariat and the Fund of which it is responsible 
(excluding those to be established anew.) 
Implementation of Laws No. 213 and 6183 
ARTICLE 15.- The Tax Regulations Law and the Collection Procedures Law for Public 
Claims shall apply for the amount to be computed and charged on taxpayers due to be 
transferred into the Fund. 
ARTICLE 16. The 2nd paragraph of Article 60 of the Value Added Tax Law No. 3665 has 
been amended as follows. 
(The additional tax assessment is composed of factors comprising of the Value Added Tax 
base. Nevertheless, the amount to be transferred to the Fund is not assessed.) 
Auditing 
ARTICLE 17.- All kinds of transactions of the Undersecretariat and the Fund shall be 
audited by a board comprised of one member from each of the Prime Ministry, the Ministry 
of National Defence and the Ministry of Finance and Customs appointed for two years. 
ARTICLE 18.- The net revenue obtained from the Lottery as such is to be deposited to the 
Fund's account at the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey before transferred to the 
Treasury by the National Lottery Administration at the end of each fiscal year by deducting 
current expenditures, investments and reserve requirements right after the previous year's 
balance sheet has become definite. (Revised version in accordance with article 48 of 
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Statutory Decree No 320 dated 6.6.1989)_ 
State Property Status 
ARTICLE 19.- Offences committed against properties and all kinds of assets of the 
Undersecretariat and the Fund thereof shall be considered as offenses committed against 
State property. The Turkish Penal Code shall apply to those offenses. No movable property 
and real estate of the Undersecretariat and of the Fund may be seized. 
Expropriation 
ARTICLE 20.- Establishments with the objective to produce weapons and munitions whose 
more than 51% of its share is owned by the Undersecretariat and the Fund shall enjoy the 
provisions of the laws and regulations pertinent to expropriation with regard to such 
^■riv'.ties. 
PROVISIONAL ARTICLE 1.- Movables and real estate of the General Directorate of 
Defence Ordnance Enterprises has been transferred to the Undersecretariat with all of its 
equipment, budget and personnel without necessitating any transaction. 
PROVISIONAL ARTICLE 2.- Shares of the Foundations established for supporting the 
Turkish Armed Forces may be transferred to the Fund. 
PROVISIONAL ARTICLE 3.- The transfer actions foreseen in Provisional Article 1 and 2 
shall be accomplished within six months. The existing practice shall continue until the 
transfer actions are complete. The transfer actions and all revenues resulting from this 
transfer shall be exempt from all taxes, dues and fees. 
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONAL ARTICLES: 
Supplementary Provisional Article l.The status of the personnel which has been altered in 
accordance with this statutory decree shall be appointed to their new position without any 
additional action. (Law No:3704) 
Supplementary Provisional Article 2.- All kinds of movables and real estate, assets and 
liabilities of the Defence Industry Development and Support Administration has been 
transferred along with its budget and personnel to the Undersecretariat without necessitating 
any transaction. 
Date of Enforcement 
ARTICLE 21.- This Law shall come into force on the date of its publication. 
Implementation 
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ARTICLE 22.- Provisions of this Law shall be implemented by the Council of Ministers. 
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LIST SHOWING THE AMENDMENTS AND STATUTORY DECREE 
SUPPLEMENTS BROUGHT TO LAW NO: 3238 
Act No Date of Date                            No. of Off.Gazette 
Implementation Published: 
3291 28.5.1986 3.6.1986 No. 19126 
3346                                2.4.1987 9.4.1987 No. 19426 
3357 15.4.1987 28.4.1987 No. 19444 
Sta.Dec.310 14.1.1988 5.2.1988 No. 19716 
Sta.Dec.320                    6.6.1988 6.6.1988 No. 
3571 14.6.1989 2.6.1989 No. 
Sta.Dec.390 30.10.1989 2.11.1989 No. 
3704 20.3.1991 24.3.1991 No. 
3796 30.4.1992 5.5.1992 No. 
3824 25.6.1992 11.7.1992 No. 
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